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Unsupervised Learning Trojan
by
Arturo Geigel
This work presents a proof of concept of an Unsupervised Learning Trojan.
The Unsupervised Learning Trojan presents new challenges over previous work
on the Neural network Trojan, since the attacker does not control most of the
environment. The current work will presented an analysis of how the attack can
be successful by proposing new assumptions under which the attack can become
a viable one. A general analysis of how the compromise can be theoretically sup-
ported is presented, providing enough background for practical implementation
development. The analysis was carried out using 3 selected algorithms that can
cover a wide variety of circumstances of unsupervised learning. A selection of 4
encoding schemes on 4 datasets were chosen to represent actual scenarios under
which the Trojan compromise might be targeted. A detailed procedure is pre-
sented to demonstrate the attack’s viability under assumed circumstances. Two
tests of hypothesis concerning the experimental setup were carried out which
yielded acceptance of the null hypothesis. Further discussion is contemplated on
various aspects of actual implementation issues and real world scenarios where
this attack might be contemplated.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Machine learning has become a mainstream tool for analysis in various industries.
Among the applications of machine learning are financial applications (Krollner et al., 2010;
McNelis, 2005), medical applications (Kononenko, 2001), and intrusion detection (Tsai et
al., 2009; Sabhnani & Serpen, 2003a), among many others. While the field is blossoming
rapidly, there are possible attacks that can target the application of such tools. During the
last few years, researchers have noticed subversion attacks to the underlying machine learning
algorithm. Such attacks are commonly known under the umbrella of adversarial knowledge
discovery (Skillicorn, 2009) or adversarial learning (Lowd & Meek, 2005). The attacks are
successful because in most cases the algorithms are designed under the assumption that the
underlying distribution is static or (very) slowly varying over time.
Most machine learning algorithms are designed to generalize the behavior of the distri-
bution given a sample of the population. The specific procedure of generalization will depend
on the underlying algorithm, and if the algorithm utilizes supervised or unsupervised learn-
ing. Once the algorithm is coded with the underlying assumptions, its data generalization
abilities are embedded into the system, and depending on its robustness, it will respond to
changes in the distribution with a better or worse performance. These assumptions can be
exploited to the benefit of an attacker that has knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of
the algorithm. The current problem is that this analysis has only recently begun to take
place in the adversarial knowledge discovery community to address this type of malicious
attacks.
This work presents a new attack on unsupervised algorithms based on the Neural
network Trojan (NnT) proposed by Geigel (2013). The new attack poses some new challenges
to the attacker, since some of the control leveraged in the NnT’s supervised learning cannot
be harnessed in an unsupervised scenario.
2This chapter first presents the problem statement which provides information on why
such attacks must be studied and analyzed to provide better security in machine learning
algorithms. The presentation follows with the dissertation goal that delineates the objective
of building a proof of concept of such attack and to document its procedure. The dissertation
goal is followed by the research questions which this work will investigate while pursuing the
study of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan (ULT). The section that follows elaborates on
the significance of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan and why its study should be pursued.
The barriers and issues will be presented to document the challenges on carrying out such
compromise. The challenges provide enough information to elaborate the approach used to
analyze the Unsupervised Learning Trojan and how to carry out the proof of concept of
such an compromise.. Finally, the proposal finishes with the reference section.
Problem Statement
This section introduces the main problem of study, which is the Unsupervised Learning
Trojan density problem and its sub-problem of cluster identification. Before details of the
problem are given, some background is provided on how the problem arises by discussing
the areas of spam and intrusion detection, which are active areas of adversarial machine
learning research. Within this area, a closer look is given to the problem of unsupervised
learning which is just beginning to be studied.
With this background, the problem of adversarial learning in unsupervised scenarios
is generalized to encompass a field that is greater than just intrusion detection, but also
encompasses all applications containing unsupervised learning algorithms by implementing
the ULT. It is within this field of reference that the Unsupervised Learning Trojan density
problem and its sub-problem of the cluster identification are framed in the discussion that
follows.
Unwanted commercial messages (UCM) and malware and can be considered tools in
furthering the underground economy. The use of UCM or spam makes a significant part
3of the Internet messages, and also to the underground economy in the form of scams and
compromises (Stone-Gross et al., 2011). By the same token, malware in general is used in
the underground economy as a tool to obtain stolen credentials (Holz et al., 2009). UCM
and malware can be said to share two common characteristics: the first is that they are
motivated by economic trends, and the second is that the techniques to target the intended
recipient are changing as countermeasures evolve.
The rise of computer malware has been, to a large extent, an evolutionary process
that started in the 1980s, and there is information that it has evolved from minor activities
of nuisance to profit oriented attacks (Hughes & DeLone, 2007; Moore et al., 2009; Simion,
2010). This profit based driven activity has also been seen in UCM (Plice et al., 2008). To
make these activities profitable, they have to overcome the hurdles of filtering mechanisms
that dampen the effects of target acquisition. In the case of the UCM, the target is the
potential buyer; and in the case of a computer compromise, the target may be a machine or
the assets stored in the machine.
Countermeasures to filter the UCM and the malware threat have evolved in response
to the changing nature of the tactics of the attackers and spammers. These, in turn, have
made the attacks more sophisticated. Some of this sophistication developed in the form
of cryptography in viruses (Young & Yung, 1996; Abidin et al., 2012). Other fairly recent
methods have been more targeted attacks in the form of advanced persistent threats (APT)
(Jeun et al., 2012). The degree of sophistication of malware in general has led to the
development of more evolved intrusion detection techniques such as those using machine
learning techniques. These, in turn, have also led to malware developers and researchers to
explore the strengths and weaknesses of these systems. Research involving vulnerabilities
in machine learning has been brought to light recently in the literature (Barreno et al.,
2008, 2010). Some specific examples of the possible impact of this analysis are shown in the
successful evasion of machine learning algorithms such as SpamBayes (Nelson et al., 2008,
2009). Under this scenario, the objective is to subvert the training of a spam filter. The
authors classify the attacks on spam filters into two categories: causative availability attacks
4and causative integrity attacks. Under causative availability, the objective is to classify ham
(benign) messages as spam. This means that benign messages will fall as undesired messages.
A contemplated scenario of this attack may be a spammer that wants to force a user to look
for his good emails in the spam category, forcing the user to look at the spam message
folder, and therefore achieving his goal. A second scenario under this attack is a malicious
contractor who would focus the spam to deny access to other competitors by sending spam
messages with words and labels used by his competitors. In contrast, under causative
integrity attacks, the objective is to create pseudospam where spam message content can
be taken from news articles or other trustworthy source; however, they also contain spam
tokens so as to shift the training to accept some carefully crafted messages.
Machine learning subversion has been mostly directed towards intrusion detection and
spam, where misdirection to bypass a filtering mechanism is the goal. The analysis of such
attacks, especially unsupervised learning algorithms, is of a nontrivial nature. A general
analysis of unsupervised machine learning subversion was started in the work of Nelson &
Joseph (2006). In this work, the objective was to carry out an attack by poisoning the data
input to the unsupervised learning classifier. The attack’s focus is to move the centroid
progressively until the radius of the hypersphere that characterizes the benign data falls
within the boundary of the attack. This allows the attack to pass as benign data. Under the
scenario proposed by Nelson & Joseph, the attacker would require an exponential number
of attack points to carry out an effective attack on the algorithm. In other words, it requires
exponential effort to displace the center of mass as it grows with the input data.
The analysis of the attack was extended in Kloft & Laskov (2012), in which the
assumption of infinite horizon window where the algorithm attacked memorizes all the data
seen so far is relaxed towards more realistic online algorithms that might be subjected to
attacks. Their analysis focuses on online algorithms that discard data points, and it was
found that recalculating the center of mass maintaining n data points needs only linear
amount of injected points. This analysis also held for the random out selection of data
points where a data point is selected at random and is removed. However, for the nearest
5out strategy, the nearest neighbor of the new data point is removed, the complexity depends
on the Voronoi cell sizes which are that sets of points which lie closer together than any other
set of points created by the data. The analysis carried out by Kloft & Laskov highlights that
real scenarios attacks on unsupervised learning are feasible to carry out under reasonable
realistic assumptions.
In Battista et al. (in press), the authors identified an additional type of attack using
obfuscation. As opposed to poisoning the data stream, obfuscation aims to hide attack sam-
ples into an already existing cluster by manipulating feature values. The attack’s objective
is to insert the malicious data into the cluster while avoiding significant alterations on the
clusters.
Another type of attack against machine learning is in the form of Trojan payloads
encoded in the data. The first Trojan of this type is the Neural network Trojan (NnT)
presented by Geigel (2013). The work showed that by also contemplating a compromise on
the algorithm implementation, it is possible to hide a payload in the encoded data stream fed
to a learning neural network. The principal challenge in this type of exploit is the learning
and generalization capabilities that are inherent in a supervised learning algorithm. To avoid
detection, the generalization, memorization and sequential execution of the payload of the
Trojan properties of the algorithm must be present, to achieve the desired exploit. Another
challenge is to select the appropriate encoding that favors both the benign data, as well
as the payload selection. In the NnT the payload selection hinged on a minimal payload
that did have the least amount of recurring strings, such that the memorization could be
successfully implemented while still retaining most of the generalization properties for the
intended data set.
The broader question of whether the analysis of the NnT can be utilized in other
machine learning techniques remains an open question, and the implications for it can be
substantial. One specific area where this could be important is in the financial sector, where
machine learning is contributing substantially in the form of high frequency trading using
unsupervised learning algorithms such as Self Organizing Feature Maps (SOFM) (Resta,
62009; Blazejewski & Coggins, 2004) and K-means (Ai et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2011).
In trying to address whether unsupervised learning can be compromised to carry a
Trojan payload, several challenges must be addressed. These challenges on the part of
the adversary are very different in nature than those present in poisoning and obfuscation
attacks against unsupervised learning algorithms. The unsupervised learning Trojan has to
deal with discrimination of the Trojan payload against the benign data. This means that in
order to trigger the attack, the clustering algorithm must segregate an actual attack from the
rest of the data. This specific problem of the attack will be referred to as the Unsupervised
Learning Trojan density problem. A sub-problem of the Trojan density problem is that of the
cluster identification as a malicious cluster within those clusters identified by the algorithm.
Both problems presents particular implementation differences depending on whether the
number of clusters is fixed or dynamically determined. Another challenge of the exploit
deals with the interpretation of the cluster points and the encoding/decoding of the payload
within the cluster elements. This falls outside of the machine learning attack and deals with
how the data points are encoded in a feasible encoding/decoding sequence for execution.
Dissertation Goal
The goal of the dissertation was to present the arguments and a proof of concept that
a Trojan can be inserted in unsupervised learning algorithms. Its aim was to expand the
analysis of the learning vulnerabilities found in the NnT to a scenario in which unsupervised
learning is compromised. The analysis of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan differs substan-
tially from the NnT, and it presented new challenges for a successful compromise. The work
tested the ULT on several unsupervised learning algorithms to show different techniques
and assumptions the attacker must make to carry out the attack. The attack can be carried
out by compromising the programming and afterwards inserting malicious elements into the
data stream to be processed by the algorithm.
The proposed work for the ULT consisted of analyzing the steps necessary to carry
7out the compromise. The analysis concentrated on a general framework where the attacker
methodologically tested the algorithm before launching the actual exploit. This methodol-
ogy resembles the experimental setup of training and testing supervised learning algorithms.
This exercise helped to determine the effectiveness of the attack on three specific unsuper-
vised learning algorithms, but at the same time give enough information to generalize the
compromise to other unsupervised algorithms. By analyzing the methodology carried out
by an attacker, security professionals can analyze the behavior of the exploit, and therefore
allow for the possibility of finding successful defenses to such attacks.
Research Questions
Throughout the research carried out in this dissertation, several questions were con-
templated that were part of the analysis of the ULT.
• Can the Trojan attack be carried out successfully on the proposed algorithms?
• Could the compromised algorithms present symptoms of compromise without analyzing the
code?
• What are the strategies for attack hiding?
• Do the algorithms require many modifications to carry out the attack?
Relevance and Significance
The attacks on machine learning algorithms through Trojans were first proposed in
Geigel (2013), and present a novel attack surface that has not been previously explored. The
capacity for encoding the attack on data streams of information for the learning algorithm
presents new challenges in analysis and detection. As covered in the NnT, the probability
of substantial polymorphism is a reality with Trojan embedding on a machine learning al-
gorithm. What differentiates this type of Trojan from previous work is that the nature of
8success and hiding depends on the statistical properties of the data and the algorithm, as
opposed to just programming vulnerabilities. The current work aims at extending the scope
of the analysis to unsupervised learning, and to highlight the unattended dangers of Trojans
on these types of algorithms. The impact on these types of compromises extend to any
application that uses the algorithms and may include applications in the security, finance,
health care fields, and unmanned vehicles, among other fields. By exposing these vulner-
abilities, proper steps can be taken to protect the algorithms and prevent the detrimental
effects of such attacks.
Studying these types of Trojans in machine learning algorithms and disseminating this
information to the security community can have a positive effect in securing these types of
algorithms from such attacks (Nizovtsev & Thursby, 2007; Arora et al., 2010). The proposed
work will present a detailed analysis of the attack mechanisms used in carrying out this type
of compromise and the methodology used during these attacks, such that future work can
concentrate on detection and avoidance before actual threats emerge. The presentation of
the ULT will expand on the work of Geigel (2013), which only dealt with a specific type of
neural network. By contrast, the present work will generalize Trojan attacks in unsupervised
machine learning. The generalization to unsupervised learning is a step further towards a
future analysis: that in principle all machine learning algorithms could be susceptible to
Trojan attacks.
Barriers and Issues
The challenge with ULT implementations is that there is no training set as in the NnT.
This makes the attack concept more difficult to carry out since the attacker does not control
the distributions used for the learning. Nonetheless, the attacker is assumed to have access
to partial capture of the data stream that will be passed to the unsupervised learning. To
demonstrate the attacks viability, it must be shown that the attacker can select the payload
of the Trojan in a manner that maximizes the probability of success in carrying the attack.
9The execution of such probability maximization is non trivial and the proposed work will
focus on the techniques that an attacker would have to develop in order to carry out the
compromise.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
One of the challenges evident in the field of study of compromises is that it is difficult
to frame what an adversary will carry out within the scope of a compromise. The nature
of compromises imposes few restrictions on the field of study by its very nature and several
strong assumptions must be made to delimit the scope. This scope delimitation, in turn,
might not necessarily reflect the actual decisions and scenarios which the attacker may
choose. A very strong underlying assumption made in this study is that the attacker will
be limited to attacking the learning algorithm directly, that is having access to the source
code. Under real world scenarios the adversary will use any technique deemed effective in
achieving its objective which may be very simple or complex in nature. Notwithstanding,
the delimitation of this study to techniques used to compromise just the field of unsupervised
learning must be assumed to delimit the scope of this study to an achievable one.
Another delimitation is that the attack optimization will be done based on abstract
grounds and will not take into account domain knowledge. While such knowledge would
certainly help both the attacker and the system designer, it would take away any gener-
alization that can be made from this study. The compromise can also be realized by an
attacker that can insert the code into the algorithm through access to the source code or
into executable files via code caves (Gawkowski & Smulko, 2010), however this stage of the
attack will be assumed and not be explored here due to the amount of possible scenarios
to explore that fall outside adversarial machine learning field. The study will focus on the
actual implementation of the data insertion and algorithm interpretation of the exploit.
Within the scope of unsupervised learning algorithms, the breadth of this study must also
be further demarcated to be manageable, but at the same time provide enough information
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on the possibility that the vulnerability is general enough to cover the field. This study will
be delimited in scope in: the algorithms chosen, the type of compromise on each algorithm,
the data selection, and the payload executed on each of the algorithms chosen.
The algorithms’ selection has been delimited to the following: K-means algorithm,
Kohonen Neural Network, and Adaptive Resonance. While the field provides an exten-
sive number of algorithms such as: spectral clustering, hierarchical clustering, and mixture
models (Webb, 2011), the chosen algorithms reflect some of the general behaviors of the
unsupervised learning field.
The use of the data sets from the UCI machine Learning Repository (Asuncion &
Newman, n.d.) provide a recognized source of data that has been submitted for peer review
and at the same time available for test reproduction purposes. The selection of specific
data sets was based on possible scenarios on which the adversary might deploy the actual
compromise. The objective is to provide a simulation that will closely resemble that of an
actual compromise on a real world system. The data sets were constrained in quantity in
an attempt to maximize the effort to show as many compromises on specific data sets, as
opposed to just one compromise on many data sets.
Selection of payloads was done to provide a executable payload which might be harder
to conceal than other types of attacks such as ASCII payloads or simple operating system
commands. The selection of payloads varied in size and specific targets to demonstrate
versatility of the compromise.
Definition of Terms
The following provides a list of specific terms used throughout this work.
Calibration phase - A step in the attacker’s design of the compromise that tests
the assumptions of the attack before the actual compromise takes place.
Cluster Identification Sub Problem - The identification of malicious clusters
within a group of clusters provided to a algorithm.
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Compromising Hull - A collection of malicious points that make up the external
“hull” or outline of points that enclose the malicious cluster center.
Degree of similarity (DS) - A measure used to determine the degree of overlap
between the clusters, by measuring how many points of a data set were included in a cluster,
other than the expected one.
Degree of Cluster Distance (DCD) - The ratio between cluster distances and the
spread of the data belonging to each cluster.
Density Estimation - An estimate of an underlying probability density based on a
sample of empirical data obtained from the underlying distribution.
Embedding Problem - The problem of inserting a malicious data set within a
normal training set, with the objective of achieving a compromise.
Extrinsic Property - A cluster property derived from the comparison of one cluster
to other clusters.
Hypersphere - An abstract representation of the generalization of a sphere on higher
dimensional space.
Imbalanced Data Set - A data set that contains a majority of samples belonging
to a specific category or distribution interval and therefore skews the representation of the
underlying distribution of data or category labels.
Intrinsic Property - A comparison of the cluster’s member elements amongst them-
selves to derive a common property that describes the cluster.
Mixture of Densities - The probability density of more than one unrelated data
set. Specifically, it refers to the combined probability density of one or more benign data
sets with that of a malicious data set.
Poisoning - The process of inserting malicious data points into a data set with the
objective of misleading the algorithm evaluating the data.
Polymorphism - The capacity of a malware to change or mutate its appearance to
avoid detection, while at the same time preserving the capacity to compromise a host and
carry out the compromise.
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Unified Distance Matrix (U-Matrix) - is a representation of the Kohonen network
that is measured using the average distance between a node’s four immediate neighbors.
Summary
The field of adversarial machine learning is becoming an increasingly important topic
in machine learning, and will become more important as more applications in security, as
well additional critical applications outside the field of security adopt machine learning
techniques. Machine learning has recently been expanded to include an area of research
that deals with machine learning under adversarial attack. Under these scenarios, most
machine learning algorithms fail, since they assume a static underlying distribution and
cannot handle an active adversary that manipulates the data. A closely related adversarial
attack is that of inserting malware leveraging machine learning characteristics such as the
Neural network Trojan and the Unsupervised Learning Trojan.
The unsupervised learning Trojan is a malware compromise designed to take advantage
of an application that uses unsupervised learning algorithms. The attack’s complexity is
higher than that of the neural network Trojan in that the attacker does not have a controlled
environment through a training set on which to supply predetermined data to the algorithm.
Instead, the attacker must estimate the effects of the data on the attack’s effectiveness, and
based on the testing scenarios, he can estimate the probability of success.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Introduction
Until recently, most of the work on the security of machine learning focused on us-
ing the learning algorithm to learn patterns to detect malicious activity. These type of
intrusion detection systems are based on anomaly detection (Verwoerd & Hunt, 2002) and
misuse detection (Sabhnani & Serpen, 2003b). The research into compromises as part of
the machine learning field have been generated as part of a new field known as adversarial
machine learning or adversarial discovery (Skillicorn, 2009). These methods of subverting
machine learning algorithms are closely related to other methodologies, such as Trojans,
whose objective is the subversion of the machine by masquerading itself as an innocent ap-
plication. Such hiding methods are also employed in cryptovirology, where the executable
code is partly hidden by encryption or it uses encryption to hijack data. All these recent
trends lead to a new field of study of machine learning for security, but also to a field in
sophisticated malware techniques that need to be studied if there is to be protection from
them.
Trojans
Arriving at a formal definition of a term in malware research is difficult, since the field
is being redefined constantly by new types of malware which have different characteristics.
The definition of Trojan is no exception. The use of the word Trojan in malware has
its origins on the Greek tale of Odysseus that had the idea of hiding Greek soldiers in a
wooden horse, in order to infiltrate Troy and win the war. An analogy of the technique
evolved by the similarity of the methods used to hide a malicious payload in computers.
Since the translation to computer systems is done by analogy, it depends on what features
particular author is focusing on to characterize the Trojan attack. This contributes to a lack
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of consensus on what constitutes a Trojan, and makes it difficult to find relevant literature
which might be classified under other topics, but might be relevant to the actual research
being conducted. Another justification for studying the categorization, lies in the high false
or failure alarm rates of current behavior analysis techniques based on Trojan detection
strategies (Chen et al., 2009). A brief survey on the different approaches the previous
literature has taken towards clarifying the definition will help in framing the discussion
further.
Whalley (1999) covers various definitions of Trojans that appear in the literature and
arrives at the conclusion that the definitions are all lacking in one way or another. The
author presents his definition as:
“A program which the user thinks or believes will do one thing (the ‘perceived purpose’), and
which may or may not do that thing, but which also does something else which is not necessary to
accomplish the perceived purpose, and of which the user would not approve (the ‘payload’).”
The definition tries to overcome the shortcomings of the previous definitions by avoid-
ing intent, purpose and malicious outcome usually mentioned in the previous definitions.
Notwithstanding, Whalley also concedes that his alternative definition also poses some draw-
backs by avoiding specificity and intent which may make other types of programs fall under
the category of Trojan.
Thimbleby et al. (1998) provide the basic components of viral infection in which the
Trojan component is included. The authors also put forth that Turing machines are inade-
quate to address the characterizations of infections. This is also recognized to some extent
by F. Cohen (2001). One of the objections of using Turing machines that specifically per-
tain to Trojans is the problem of framing what is masquerading. Masquerading is defined in
Thimbleby et al. as the notion “where a user knows the names of programs and anticipates
their likely behavior”. Another difficulty with Turing machine models is defining the notion
of “other” programs, as is the case of a Trojan payload. The authors provide an alternative
approach to Turing machine models by specifying a representation, which represents the
full state of a machine and an environment map that can be taken to be the configuration
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of the system. Finally, a meaning represents what a program does when it is executed in
the machine, and the definitions of similarity and the for most quantifier clarifies what the
usual term of ’indistinguishable’ means. This marks an important development that defines
the environment where Trojan executes and its characteristics, since without the distin-
guishable/indistinguishable property one cannot identify programs running in the model as
Trojan or non-Trojan.
The work of Thimbleby et al. was objected by Mäkinen (2001) on the grounds that
the five arguments exposed by Thimbleby et al. are not enough to substitute Turing machine
models. In a rebuttal, Thimbleby et al. (2001) explain that alternatives such as those exposed
by Mäkinen would entail intricate solutions. One of the intricate solutions would imply the
invocation of an environment, observer and the notion of ’true meaning’. Thimbleby et
al. do recognize that both solutions still need to be further explored, in order to settle the
matter.
In Zuo et al. (2006), the authors take a different approach to F. Cohen (1987, 2001)
and Thimbleby et al. (1998), and extend (Adleman, 1990; Zuo & Zhou, 2004) concept’s of
recursive functions to describe the notion of infection and imitation within this framework.
The imitation property consist of a recursive program that behaves in some computation
like the original program by defining it in terms of the existential quantifier. This allows for
variation on some computations, while behaving differently in others, and hence, this allows
for the notion of imitation which is one of the core characteristics of a Trojan.
An alternative to defining a Trojan horse is to use a general taxonomy under which,
if the software contains N characteristics then it can be considered to be infected by a
Trojan, and therefore be compromised. This approach is taken in (Karresand, 2003). In his
work, the author uses the technical description model of IT weapons (TEBIT) taxonomy.
The objective with this approach is to find a representative group of characteristics of the
software weapons to be defined, categorize them, and calculate the standard deviation from
the main characteristics.
While the problem of defining a Trojan and its characteristics takes a substantial
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amount of literature, there is a segment of the literature that avoids the problem altogether
and follows a more operational approach, focusing on the detection of the Trojans based on
assumed characteristics or behavior. Qin et al. (2010) use a module that detects operating
systems objects such as registry, file, and ports systems services, among others, to monitor
the state of the operating system. Each object being monitored is assigned a weight and
a suspicious degree, and is then evaluated using a dot product; and if it exceeds a certain
threshold value, then it is labeled as a Trojan. Tang (2009) focuses on the Microsoft PE
executable format, uses decision trees to derive relevant characteristics of the format, and
uses these filtered characteristics to train a neural network. The experimental results show
that the selected headers of the PE executable format provide better results than using
all headers. Alternatively, Y.-F. Liu et al. (2010) use instance based learner, Naive Bayes,
and decision trees to evaluate a system’s catalog of operating system behavior. The system
behavior catalog includes multiple attributes in network messages, processor, thread, system,
and object categories. The authors concluded that depending on the specific mixture of
attributes, some might become relevant, while others might become less relevant and can
provide lower results. Further, the authors found that NaiveBayes performed better in terms
of efficiency and accuracy than the other compared classifiers.
A recent trend in malware is the addition of Trojans at the hardware level. A proposed
taxonomy to describe hardware Trojans is given in Tehranipoor & Koushanfar (2010). The
authors’ taxonomy focuses more on hardware mechanisms such as particular activation char-
acteristics actions and physical characteristics that distinguishes hardware Trojans. While
some are related to software Trojans, other mechanisms, such as activations through sensors
or logic circuit execution, are particular to hardware Trojans.
Baumgarten et al. (2011), on the other hand, put particular interest on the hardware
Trojans distribution channel, which is particularly vulnerable to attacks. They describe the
vulnerabilities in hardware distribution channel and how trust, lack of secure part authenti-
cation, and theft can all play to the attacker’s advantage when using hardware Trojans. The
authors also describe different types of attackers along the supply chain: designer attackers,
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fabrication attackers, and distribution attackers.
A particular hardware Trojan horse that has been documented, which is of particular
significance, is given in Wei & Potkonjak (2013). The Trojan is particular in its difficulty
in detection, since it relies on stressing certain gates and delay faults within the integrated
circuit’s output. These methods of hardware Trojan activation due to stress can be quite
effectively implemented, based on the available documentation and represent a real concern
in modern circuit design.
A field of virology that is not directly related to Trojans, but has been used in Trojans,
has been Cryptovirology (Young & Yung, 2004). Cryptovirology is the study of the uses
of cryptography applied to viral applications. There are two general application scenarios
(Anandrao Shivale, 2011). The first is polymorphism: where the virus uses encryption to
change and make unreadable part of its code. The second is the crypto viral extortion:
where the virus encrypts a target system’s files. The attacker then demands a ransom to
hand over the key to regain access to the hostage files. The author provides analysis of
a Trojan attack that used the crypto viral extortion and further giving counter measures
that can be implemented to protect against such attack. The uses of encryption as they are
applied by AI algorithms are covered more thoroughly in the next section.
Encryption Through AI Algorithm
Encryption in AI algorithms is a field that is of recent interest, and based on the
reviewed literature, had its beginning with the work of (Pointcheval, 1995). The objective
of the field is to use the AI or machine learning algorithm to make a message unreadable.
A particular example is given in (Kanter et al., 2002), where two two-layered perceptron
neural networks are trained together until they synchronize to form a cryptographic system.
A recent effort is that of Ismail et al. (2012), where they use a Multi Layer Perceptron to
do symmetric encryption. The analogy is drawn by representing the weights as the public
key, and the biases of the hidden and output layers as the private keys. The private keys
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are agreed by the sender and receiver, and act as private keys in a symmetric encryption
scheme. The key length is chosen based on the number of neurons in the hidden layer for the
hidden bias, and the number of neurons in the output layer used for the output bias. The
keys must be numeric. The network is trained using a variant of backpropagation (using
momentum). The public key is then distributed, and the output can be transmitted.
Another area of research is selecting the ’key’ in image encryption using genetic algo-
rithms is covered in Bhowmik & Acharyya (2011). The authors’ objective is to choose the
best chromosome by maximizing the fitness value. This will make the chromosome the best
’key’, so that when it is applied to the Blowfish algorithm (Schneier, 2007), the correlations
among the pixels become minimized. An alternative approach is presented by Mahmood
et al. (2013), who worked with genetic algorithms to use selective encryption to provide
security to medical images. Selective encryption is the encryption of selected parts of the
image or using different algorithms to achieve better performance in processing the images.
The system evaluates: the encryption algorithm to be used, key-length, robustness parame-
ter (correlation or pixel change rate), number of regions, and side information (information
needed for transmission of the encrypted data). The objective is to minimize the trade-offs
incurred between the processing time and the resulting robustness of the encryption.
A novel approach to using neural networks for cryptoanalysis is presented in Alani
(2012). Where the neural network used scaled conjugate-gradient, and was utilized using
ciphertext as its input and plaintext as its output. The network is assumed that it will
retrieve plaintext from cyphertext not used in the training, if the same key is used.
Adversarial Machine Learning
The security of machine learning has attracted recent attention due to the proliferation
of machine learning algorithms in security applications, such as spam detection and intrusion
detection. The interest lies in that these systems are subjected to an adversary whose
purpose is to constantly change behavior to avoid detection and subvert the system. This
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contrasts with traditional applications of machine learning where the distribution is assumed
to be stationary due to the slowly changing nature of the phenomena traditionally studied.
In Barreno et al. (2006, 2010) a taxonomy for attack categorization is presented by the
authors, in which they specify the influence, security violations, and specificity of attacks
as the central axes of the taxonomy. The proposed taxonomy allows categorizations of the
attack, as well as exploring the defenses that are available to counter such attacks.
In characterizing the domain of adversarial learning, the attack’s effectiveness is de-
pendent on several factors, such as the knowledge of the attacker. A major principle that
should be followed when studying adversarial machine learning is Kerckhoffs’s principle that
states “the security of a system should not rely on unrealistic expectations of secrecy” (Huang
et al., 2011). The initial study under this assumption was done by Dalvi et al. (2004), where
they used a similar approach to evolutionary game theory. They assumed that adversary
can use an optimal plan, and that the Classifier also uses an optimal classification to counter
the inputs of the attacker.
In Lowd & Meek (2005), the authors present an alternative to Dalvi et al. statement
of the problem and propose the adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) problem.
As opposed to obtaining an optimal strategy, ACRE assumes imperfect knowledge on the
part of the attacker, and that the aim of the attacker is to identify the outcomes of queries
that provide insight into a classifier’s inner workings. The ACRE problem relies not just on
the attacker’s knowledge of the classifier, but also on the adversarial cost function, which is
the cost associated to the usage of particular instances, depending on the complexity of the
implementation. In other words, under ACRE, some implementations of the attack might
involve less effort to carry out to extract information, than others.
Nelson, Rubinstein, et al. (2011) expand the notion of ACRE by generalizing the
problem in two different ways. The first generalization opens the analysis to many classifiers
that are not convex and utilized in practice. The second generalization deals with evasion
techniques which consist of the attackers ability to refine the method of sampling data to see
if better estimates can be obtained. The new attack strategy also contemplates additional
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feedback from the training distribution, such as the information gleaned by the adversary
when he obtains samples from the training data, which may become representative of the
underlying distribution. The authors also try to delimit the available information that the
attacker has with respect to the mappings to the feature space.
A different approach to Nelson, Rubinstein, et al. is explored in W. Liu & Chawla
(2009), where ACRE is used under the assumption that adversarial machine learning is a
Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg game model assumes that a leader (the adversary) will
make the first move, and the follower is the learning algorithm. The follower reacts to the
leader, and it is assumed that the leader will know this and will maximize the payoff, and
in turn so will the follower. The authors used genetic algorithms simulating the scenarios of
the adversarial Stackelberg game. The simulations always ended with a solution where the
Stackelberg equilibrium was effectively found.
A more general and relaxed approach to the analysis of adversarial learning is done
by Laskov & Kloft (2009). The authors take a different approach to the other authors in
that they provide an analysis procedure consisting of four steps. The first step consists of
axiomatizing the learning procedure and the attack process. The second step relies on a
detailed specification of the attacker’s constraints. The next step consists of specifying the
various attack scenarios and identifying the optimal ones. The final step consists of the
determination of the bounds for the selected optimal attack scenarios specified in step three.
The use of this strategy led the authors to conclude that applying the steps to practical
problems led to more optimistic results on the part of designing effective algorithms to
counter adversaries.
Nelson, Biggio, & Laskov (2011) analyze the risks of learning within an adversarial
setting through a statistical learning framework. However, the exposition is theoretical,
as opposed to the preceding discussion of Laskov & Kloft, and cannot be calculated in real
case scenarios. Nonetheless, by arriving at bounds for a particular contamination, the model
may yield worst case scenarios on which to provide upper bounds on adversarial capacity.
These worst case scenarios can then be used as criteria in the selection of algorithms for
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contamination scenarios. The authors present the analysis starting with the scenario where
the contamination exhibits itself as an outlier. The second scenario is the data perturbation
where the data points are perturbed by noise. This noise is intended to displace the data
points to the attackers’ advantage. The next scenario is label flipping where benign and
malicious labels are interchanged. Finally, the authors present the feature constrained outlier
scenario, in which the features themselves are corrupted. These scenarios are then used by
the authors to measure the stability of the classifier subjected to contamination. The derived
measure to measure the stability is referred to by the authors as the classification robustness.
This measure translates in linear classifiers as the rotation angle of the hyperplane under
contamination.
Biggio et al. (2013) use an adversarial model that describes the adversary’s goal in
terms of a utility loss function. The model also contemplates the adversary’s target system
and the adversary’s capabilities in similar organizational manner as that of Laskov & Kloft
(2009). The model is used by Biggio et al. to characterize attacks on systems using gradient
descent. The objective is to fool the algorithms, such as neural networks and support vector
machines, into classifying samples which have close relationship between them (as in the case
of similar handwritten digits). The caveat is that the attacker must guess the underlying
distribution, and use data points from densely populated regions to carry out a successful
evasion by using the closeness between benign and malicious data. The framework was also
used in defeating biometric systems Biggio et al. (2012), as a poisoning attack that gradually
compromises the biometric template used to store the biometric signature until the benign
template is replaced by the malicious one.
Overall the field of adversarial learning can be compared to an arms race (Roli, 2013),
where the attacker first analyzes the machine learning algorithm and tries to use it to his
advantage; then the designer of the machine learning algorithm system counteracts with an
update to the system. The process then repeats itself in a recurring cycle.
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Neural Network Trojan
Implementation vulnerabilities for neural networks were described in Geigel (2013),
nonetheless, these vulnerabilities can be generalized to other learning algorithms and can
be classified into three categories. The first category are vulnerabilities that arise from
the data, and aim to poison the data (Kloft & Laskov, 2007; Nelson & Joseph, 2006), by
adding specifically crafted data to influence the learning. The specific taxonomy in this
category of attacks is given in Barreno et al. (2010). The second category of vulnerabilities
takes advantage of the algorithm behavior by compromising the integrity of the algorithm,
encompassing attacks where the attacker uses the training cycle to embed malicious payloads
in order to create a compromise. The third category is a compromise on the programming
or the hardware where the learning algorithm runs. While the three vulnerabilities can be
exploited independently, the use of the three categories to launch an attack can fall under
the category of Trojan horses (Thimbleby et al., 1998).
The implementation of the NnT assumes that the elements of Payload P ′ can be
modeled as independent from one another. This assumption is needed, since insertion of P ′
into a benign training data B′ may lead to some elements of P ′ to be categorized as B′, as
well as some elements of B′ into P ′. The relationship between any vector x X on the mixed
data set that contains elements of the category C is expressed in terms of the conditional
probability density:
φi (X|Cγ) =
∫
P (x|Cγ) dx (1)
Where the category label γ may be either B′ or P ′. Since the training set mixes both
B′ or P ′, this gives rise to the notion of a mixture of densities expressed as:
2∑
i=1
φi (X|Cγ) = φ1((X|CP ′)) + φ2((X|CB′)) (2)
This last formula gives rise to the possibility of N mixtures of payloads that can be
expressed in terms of a more general formula:
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Ω =
n∑
i=1
φi (X|Cγ) (3)
This generalized mixture of conditional densities leads to the problem of creating a
Trojan for a neural network as the embedding problem that can be postulated as:
“Given a Neural network N, can we use a training data based on the mixture of conditional
probability densities Ω to train the neural network N to memorize the known distribution
payload P ′ that is embedded as part of Ω, and generalize the distribution of the benign data
B′?” (Geigel, 2013)
The embedding problem for the neural Trojan is based upon several underlying as-
sumptions listed below:
1. The attacker controls the process of development of the algorithm implementation and the
end user does not know that the application has an unwanted side effect.
2. The attacker controls the training and testing process of the Neural Trojan implementation.‌
3. The attacker can construct the distribution of the payload P ′ in an arbitrary fashion.
4. The attacker can manipulate the parameters of the algorithm.
5. The attacker can manipulate encoding of the data to his advantage.
6. Any lack of convergence can be compensated at the post processing stage.
These assumptions allow the attacker to deploy the Trojan under reasonable real world
scenarios. The NnT is implemented on a basic backpropagation neural network and on the
Neural Network Trojan with Sequence Processing Connections (NNTSPC). In the NNTSPC,
the backpropagation neural network is followed by a gating function that is activated by one
of the inputs. The Trojanized networks are tested on a synthetic data set and on the
Congressional Voting Records Data Set (Asuncion & Newman, n.d.). Due to the different
training parameters, the NnT can encode the payload under different weight matrices. This
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ability to achieve a high mutation rate of matrices gives the NnT a high polymorphic capa-
bility, making it extremely difficult to detect in the encoded phase, and it is only after the
Trojan is decoded and executed that it may be possible to discern its compromised nature.
Summary
The field of machine learning is being actively studied as the trend of using machine
learning in diverse areas continues to grow. As the applications for machine learning in
security related areas continue to grow, so do the threats to the algorithms that make up
these systems. Current research shows that the need to adopt Kerckhoffs’s principle is
essential in providing the necessary robustness to withstand attacks on machine learning
algorithms. The research has provided different assumptions and criteria on which to judge
Kerckhoffs’s principle based on theoretical upper bounds, as well as reasonable practical
assumptions. As the field matures, it is expected that several of the related fields such as
cryptoviruses, AI encryption, and Trojans see a converging path. Recently, the convergence
has only been slightly touched by the implementation of the Neural Network Trojan.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Methodology
The proposed approach starts with the analysis of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan
from the basic assumptions of the NnT, and then shows how the unsupervised Trojan devi-
ates from the supervised learning assumptions. The discussion then describes the analysis of
the unsupervised learning parameters that need to be taken into account to carry out a suc-
cessful attack. Three algorithms, four data sets, and eight payloads were arbitrarily selected
as representatives of the unsupervised learning field. An individual background is given on
each of the individual algorithms, and based on the general characteristics of the algorithms,
the procedures for payload encoding were adjusted accordingly. An experimental setup is
devised to simulate the steps required by an adversary before the attack. These steps can be
taken to be the “training” set of the experimental procedure. An evaluation criteria is given
based on the measurements obtained during the “training session” which serve as selection
criteria of the best parameters to use in the actual compromise. The actual compromise
would represent the “testing” procedure of the experimental setup.
The Unsupervised Learning Trojan Density Problem
For the Unsupervised Learning Trojan, the assumptions given for the NnT embedding
problem described above must be reevaluated, as they either would need to be modified or
would not apply. For the NnT, these assumptions allow the attacker to have an ideal
scenario, where the attacker can manipulate both the training data set and the payload
without any restriction, so that he can arbitrarily construct any training distribution. In
such cases, the attacker has perfect information and is able to choose the strategy that
maximizes his utility. This means that attacker can successfully manipulate the training so
that the prior probability of the compromise can be theoretically chosen to be unity. Under
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this scenario, the attacker can train the neural network to a desired degree of accuracy vs.
the polymorphic ability of the attack. This leaves the attacker with just needing to set the
appropriate mixture Ω to achieve his goal.
This is not the case for the Unsupervised Learning Trojan. Under this new type of
attack, the attacker does not have control of a training set, and now the parameters need
to be estimated instead of being available for manipulation. This process takes the form
of density estimation of the distributions. Since the benign data and the payload are given
to the algorithm without labels, the goal of the compromised algorithm is to discriminate
between the benign data and the payload. The question to be answered is whether an
unsupervised algorithm is capable of discriminating between unlabeled malicious samples
and the benign data. We can start the analysis with Equation 3, which now becomes:
Ω =
n∑
i=1
φi (X|ψ) (4)
where ψ are the parameter vectors for the class. In addition, the attacker no longer
has the full control of the prior probabilities as in the NnT, and the mixtures are now
determined by:
Ω =
n∑
i=1
φi (X|ψ)P (ψ) (5)
The question that immediately follows is: If given a Unsupervised Learning Trojan,
can the attacker arbitrarily manipulate the cluster selection?
The goal of the attacker will be: To achieve a mixture, given two densities φ and φi+1,
such that:
φ (x|ψcomp) 6= φi+1 (x|ψCi+1) (6)
where ψcomp is the composite parameter vector for the attackers mixture. This argu-
ment can then be generalized to any number of mixtures.
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The equations above must satisfy the following relation for the parameter vectors
ψcomp for the class:
ψcomp 6= ψCi+1 (7)
and must also meet the requirement of the Trojan elements xT ′1i ∈ XT
′ , where XT ′ is
the vector class of Trojanized inputs. To meet these requirements, the attacker must estimate
the volume density spread of the Trojan cluster and maximize the inter cluster distance
with the benign data to avoid overlaps between the payload and the benign information
that may hamper the execution of the compromise. It can also be stated that: in absence
of any information about the Trojanized inputs, the assumption will be made that the
Trojan elements will be treated as random vectors, whose behavior can be described by a
parametrized form, and will behave the same along all dimension of the vector space on
which it operates. This will simplify the analysis of the Trojan behavior and the benign
data, and will also have a big impact on the encoding of the Trojan payload P ′.
The volume density of the Trojan attack may be determined by:
P (Trojan) =
∫
V
p (x) dx (8)
While the attacker does not have a training set to compromise, as in the case of the
NnT, it is assumed that the attacker has access to the algorithm, its implementation, and
to information regarding the goal of the implementation. By having access to the goal of
the implementation, he can sample elements from the population and draw inferences as to
the possible clusters that might be formed during an actual implementation.
To model the compromise, the sampling done by the attacker will have a sample N
that has embedded a set of compromised points mTrojan, which are the result of the inputs
XT
′ into a solution space, acting as the payload P ′. The probability P (Trojan) of mTrojan
falling on the correct cluster defined by a density function p (x) covering a volume v that
lies on an interval V is given by:
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P (Trojan) =
∫
V
p (x) dx = p (x) v ≈ mTrojan
N
= M (9)
p (x) =
M
v
(10)
The attacker must further assume that there will still be scattering of the Trojan
elements around the centroid. As long as the attacker has no specific information on the
Trojan density behavior, the p(x) can be modeled in general terms by:
p(x) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
(2piσ2)1/2
exp
(
− (x− µ)2
2σ
)
(11)
which gives the volume v in terms of the σ, and mTrojanN as µ.
A similar definition can be done for the benign data that the attacker will try to keep
in a separate cluster but cannot avoid scattering. As the attacker defines the specific Trojan
and gathers information on the data set, he may acquire certain information on the centrality
of the points and the scattering, which may or may not be homogeneous. Therefore, a more
general description becomes:
Ω′ =
n∑
i=1
φi
(
X|µ,
∑)
(12)
where Ω′ contains φi densities that belong to Payload P ′, and the component density
φi (X|µ,
∑
) is a D dimensional Gaussian (Murphy, 2012), where
∑
i is the covariance matrix
D and Transp is the transpose:
φi
(
X|µ,
∑)
=
1(
2pi)D/2 ‖∑i‖)1/2 exp
(
−1
2
(x− µ)Transp∑−1i (x− µ)) (13)
The next section will lay the groundwork for the actual attack deployment, followed by
the analysis of a practical example, taking under consideration the model explained above.
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Attacker’s Analysis of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan Density Problem
The compromise scenarios presented are based on the assumption that the attacker
can have access to the samples and approximate the behavior of the attack with the obtained
samples. The analysis will focus on testing the assumptions before launching the attack on
a compromised algorithm and obtain the equivalent of cluster validity measures (Davies
& Bouldin, 1979; Bezdek & Pal, 1998; Kim & Ramakrishna, 2005; Deborah et al., 2010).
This analysis carried out by the attacker occurs during a calibration phase of the attack,
which is similar to the validation phase under supervised learning, where the attacker,
using the compromised algorithm, will tweak the parameters of the attack before the actual
compromise takes place.
While the attacker does not have full control of the prior probability for all the data,
the attacker may impose some constraints on the payload’s prior P (ψ) based on strategic
selection of the payload’s characteristics and encoding. If no other information is obtained
during the calibration phase of the attack besides the sampled obtained data, he must
assume a certain distribution of the unknown example and this will be based on equation
13. Under special scenarios where the attacker chooses to attack certain selected data sets,
the attacker can make further assumptions under most real scenarios of the spread of the
densities of the benign data. For example, given a census data, the attacker can infer that
the probability that a sample X from the data is over 100 years of age and has Y other
characteristics. While the aforementioned analysis may be used it is a strong assumption
that will not further be pursued in this study and the basic starting point of equation 13
will be used.
The attacker can leverage the intercepted data to select the appropriate subspace for
the Trojan, and from there, he can approximate:
f (N,mTrojan) ≈ ftraining(M) (14)
where ftraining is the training derived function using sampled data. This last equa-
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tion justifies that an analysis of the calibration phase, under the reasonable assumptions
and properly executed attack components, the attacker can, in principle, approximate the
underlying distribution that the algorithm will use in the compromise. This reasoning, in
turn, allows for the attacker’s analysis of the clusters under a calibration or “training” phase.
The starting measurement to be used is an approximation to the equation 10, using
the obtained data set during the calibration stage of the attack. The approximation in D
dimensions is the cluster density DY that can be obtained by:
DYTrojan =
Mtrojan√
(Max−Min)2D1Trojan + ...+ (Max−Min)2DnTrojan
, (15)
where M is the average number of sample points in the Trojan cluster over the total
number of elements of the Trojan, and the denominator volume measurement can be made
on n dimensions D of the Trojan cluster. The density for the benign clusters can be defined
similarly.
The use of equation 15 can be adversely be affected by the misclassification of samples
and malicious data during the calibration phase. To quantify the possible misclassification
due to the overlap in the tails of the assumed Gaussians, the attacker can use the degree of
similarity DS between the clusters. The DS measure is intended to determine the degree
of overlap between the clusters. The formula for the degree of similarity DS is given below:
DS =
NMCTrojan +NMCBenign
N
(16)
where N represents the number of points in the two clusters, NMCTrojan is the num-
ber of Trojan elements that were misclassified as part of the benign cluster, and NMCBenign
is defined similarly. The goal is to minimize the number of misclassified elements on both
cluster elements. The formula is also applicable to more than two clusters, since the mis-
classification is centered on Trojan elements and inclusion of other members into the Trojan
cluster.
The density calculation 15 is very useful in providing density information, however
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within the enclosed volume, the distribution of samples may be skewed. A measure of
“skewness” will be calculated by using Degree of Cluster Distance (DCD) given by:
DCD =
√
(CLTrojan − CLBenign)2D1 + . . .+ (CLTrojan − CLBenign)
2
Dn√
(Max−Min)2D1 + . . .+ (Max−Min)2Dn
, (17)
where CL is the specific centroid location coordinates, and (Max−Min)2 is the
squared distance of the maximum and minimum of the data points along the dimension D
of the clusters. The DCD grows as the distance between centroids increases (the numerator)
or as the spread distance between the dimension D decreases (the denominator). The Trojan
designer will try to maximize the DCD.
If the DCD is too small, then the cluster should be reassessed or eliminated due to
the closeness of the clusters. What this implies is that cluster centroids that are too close
with little spread among the data might be too similar for discriminative assignments.
The attacker can use the information obtained to establish the measures given above
and make reasonable estimates of the attacks effectiveness. An important question to answer
is whether he can further take advantage of the Gaussian assumption to simulate the rest of
the data that the user will work with during the compromise. This will lead to two different
scenarios to test, one where the attacker uses only the intercepted data, and the other where
the attacker extends the obtained data using the parametric assumptions to further increase
his chances of success.
The Cluster Identification Sub Problem
The cluster identification sub problem is the distinguishing of the malicious cluster
from those identified by the algorithm as benign. This presents several challenges, since the
algorithm’s discriminative measures are not designed to discriminate clusters, just separate
them. Cluster discriminative measures can be altered to identify one or more compromise
clusters using either intrinsic or extrinsic attributes of the malicious payload.
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Intrinsic properties are those properties that can be found by just analyzing the prop-
erties within a single cluster. Some of the properties that can be used are:
• Size of the sampled data
• Location
• Uniformity
• Density
• Shape
• Surface area
• Topology
• Inter point relationship
• Temporal behavior
The size of the sampled data within a specified cluster can be used as identification when it
reaches a certain threshold, where it acts as a trigger for the payload to be decoded, executed
or both. For example, if the amount of data in a particular cluster exceeds the normal count
of n samples, then this serves as the trigger for the next data elements that form part of
the cluster to be malicious. The strategy can also be implemented by using the location
of the cluster or when the cluster moves its position to a certain predetermined location.
The location trigger can be obtained if, for example, the location of the cluster falls within
the lower right quadrant of the usual locations prescribed in a Cartesian coordinate system,
tagging this cluster as the malicious one.
The clusters uniformity, density, shape, and surface area can also be used to trigger
the cluster identification in a manner similar to previous attributes. When a particular
identified cluster reaches the predetermined uniformity measure or density, then the cluster
is identified as malicious.
Using topology as an intrinsic property that identifies the malicious cluster is more
difficult to implement. However, the topological property of connectedness in a region can
be implemented by partitioning the clusters into equal size subspaces. If a subspace within
the cluster is empty, then we can say that two regions separated by this subspace are not
connected and may lead to identification of the cluster as malicious.
Identifying malicious clusters by using inter point relationship within a cluster can
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be carried out in one of several ways. An example would be to measure the angle of each
point relative to a single identified point in the cluster, such as the cluster’s centroid. Other
interrelation attributes may be the Euclidean distance relative to the cluster’s centroid,
positioned in a specific order, such as clockwise or counterclockwise measurement execution.
The temporal behavior can be broken down into three sub properties. The first strat-
egy is to take advantage of the frequency of occurrence in a specific temporal interval in
order to activate the payload. The second strategy is to use a specific input sequence, in an
order for which its probability of occurrence is highly improbable. In the third variant, the
sequence elements are not relevant, but the timing of arrival into an online algorithm will
be the activation trigger.
Extrinsic properties are those that set the malicious payload apart from the rest of
the benign data, by comparing the behavior of the malicious cluster(s) from those that
are benign. The same properties used under the intrinsic analysis can be used as extrinsic
properties. To give several examples, the size of the sampled data can now be measured as
the difference between clusters, as opposed to just a predetermined cluster, (e.g. make the
cluster an outlier that can be distinguished as the attack payload). The location property
can be measured as the location relative to other clusters that are being analyzed. The same
extension used in these two examples can be done for the other properties as well.
A final example would be the density relationship of the clusters, where the comparison
between clusters can be represented as an imbalanced set. Under this scenario, one of the
classes is underrepresented with respect to other classes that are present in the data set,
making the relative density of the cluster less than the others. The attacker can take
advantage of this imbalance to determine which of the clusters is the Trojan payload and
activate it.
Payload Activation and Decoding
The payload activation and encoding strategy will depend on the specific data set
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qualities that the attacker can use to his advantage. The strategy can be divided into
two separate stages: payload activation and encoding. The activation and decoding of the
payload are directly related to the cluster identification sub problem, since the identification
leads to both the activation and decoding of the payload. The activation and decoding of
the payload may occur at the same time or at different stages of the exploit.
In the activation phase, the compromised algorithm detects that one or more data
items are part of the payload of the attack. While oﬄine algorithms may not have a specific
sequence of data input or are using randomized ordering for the input data, it is necessary
to have an ordering for payload decoding.
The payload decoding is described by:
P (Ssuccess) = P (s1, . . . , sn) =
∏
P (sj |sj−1, . . . , s) (18)
= P (sj |sj−1, . . . , s)P (sj−1|sj−2, . . . , s) . . . P (s2|s1)P (s1)
The success of carrying out the probability constraint in Equation 18 lies in the ability
to have a successful activation and subsequent strategy using intrinsic or extrinsic properties
that can take advantage of the well ordering principle. That is, in this work, a well ordered
sequence using this principle is a decoding sequence using an intrinsic or extrinsic property
that can be put in a one to one relationship with the natural numbers, such that the first
element of the sequence is the first element, and the second element of the sequence is the
second element, and so on. This one to one correspondence can in turn be translated into a
temporal sequence using this one to one relationship.
Practical Considerations
The implementation phase deals with inserting compromised elements into the al-
gorithm, such that when it receives the desired data inputs, it will carry out the desired
behavior of the attacker. The generic architecture of a typical unsupervised learning algo-
rithm is given in Figure 1, which presents the architecture in three parts: the preprocessing
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part, the main algorithm, and the post processing part of the algorithm. The proposed
attack focuses on compromising the algorithm and using the post processing part of the
architecture to decode the payload in an optimal manner. While it can be advantageous to
prefilter the data in the preprocessing part to further guarantee the chances of success, it
will not be covered in this work.
Figure 1. Diagram of a compromised algorithm
The generic steps to carry out the compromise are given in the Algorithm 1 shown
below:
Algorithm 1 Generic steps carried out by an attacker to construct an Unsupervised Learn-
ing Trojan
1. Determine which intrinsic or extrinsic measurements to add
as part of the compromised code and the decoding sequence strategy.
2. Carry out the analysis of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan
density problem. If successful, go to step 4, else continue to step 3.
3. Determine stabilization techniques that are necessary, and return to step 1.
4. Substitute the benign code with the compromised algorithm.
5. Inject the payload in the same manner as steps 1 through 3, to achieve the predetermined
objective.
The first step is to determine which intrinsic or extrinsic property will be used to
trigger the payload activation and decoding of the attack. The selection does not exclude
the possibility of combining multiple properties to carry out the compromise. An example
would be using the location of the cluster within a predetermined location as the activation
trigger, and then use the inter point distance to decode the payload. From this step, the
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attack can then be tested by inserting the payload into the benign data.
The second step involves the analysis of Equations 15 through 17 to determine the
attack’s efficacy. A careful tradeoff must be considered by the attacker at this stage between
making a successful attack, and at the same time minimizing the possibility of detection due
to a recognizable pattern that characterizes the payload.
The third step consists of stabilizing of the cluster, if required. The stabilization is
aimed at manipulating the clusters of benign data to maximize the probability that the
compromise is successful. A description of cluster stabilization can be carried out using
the influence and security violations axis (Barreno et al., 2010). The influence axis allows
for causative and exploratory attacks, and deals with the adversary’s ability to influence
or observe the training data. The security violations axis describes the type of security
violations that the attacker can make, and consists of integrity and availability attacks.
Integrity attacks refer to allowing false negatives, while availability attacks create denials of
service.
In this work, the influence axis will be modified in the form of malicious data influ-
encing benign data, so that the attacker can attempt to maximize the inter cluster distance.
In turn, the security violations axis will be used as access denial, so the attacker can force
the clusters into a stationary state, where the attacker can inject the payload without being
overtaken by the benign data. This deviates from Nelson & Joseph (2006) approach, where
the objective is to subvert a detector by shifting the non-anomalous region hypersphere
into the space where the attack vector is located, so that the detector would treat it as
non-anomalous.
If the compromise is not successful at steps 2 and 3, the attacker may carry out further
cluster stabilization techniques such as: denial of service, inserting more data to balance the
cluster to the desired outcome, or return to step 1 to redesign the attack. If the attack is
successful, the attacker can then proceed to step 4, which is to substitute the benign code
with the Trojanized code and let it stay dormant until step 5 can be executed. Step 5 will
be the actual injection of the payload into the benign stream, which will depend on whether
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the algorithm is online or batch. The attack will mimic the simulation of data injection
carried out by the attacker in steps 1 through 3.
Algorithms and Data Sets
This section shows the necessary setup to carry out the Unsupervised Learning Trojan
with three selected unsupervised algorithms to demonstrate the analysis and concepts that
the attacker must take into account for a successful attack. The three selected algorithms
are:
• K-means algorithm (MacQueen, 1967)
• Kohonen Neural Network (Kohonen, 1982, 1989)
• Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART-1) (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1998)
Within this work, implementation of each algorithm were be based on the original algorithm
to increase the vector surface of attack, since it is more probable that the original algorithms
have a wider adoption than more recent variants of the algorithms. It is also easier to gen-
eralize from the original algorithm to the more recent variants, than the other way around.
Each of the three algorithms presented a different aspect of unsupervised learning and dif-
ferent challenges to the deployment of the ULT. While K-means measures the centroids on
a real dimensional space, Adaptive Resonance is based on binary input variables. Adaptive
Resonance also has a growing number of clusters, while Kohonen and K-means have fixed
number of clusters. These differences will be covered during the analysis of the compromise.
The selected data sets to be analyzed were taken from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository (Asuncion & Newman, n.d.). The four selected data sets are shown in Table
1. The choice of data set for a particular algorithm will be made based on the algorithm’s
ability to process a specific attribute type and the need for multiple data sets per algorithm.
The vector entries within each of these data sets will be divided into “training”, “vali-
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dation”, and “testing” sets. The “training” set will be the data available to the attacker, and
the "testing" will simulate the algorithm in the attack environment. The sets were chosen
to reflect possible power, medical, and scientific analysis, to cover some possible real world
scenarios under which the compromise might be possible. Also, the data sets were selected
with both integer and real values, to simulate various types of possible encoding strategies.
Finally, the data sets were also selected varying from “low” to “high” instance availability,
to show various loose, as well as constrained access, to data scenarios.
Data set Attribute Type Instances Attributes
KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Integer, Real 53,414 24
Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Real 2,075,259 9
Statlog Project (Shuttle) Integer 58,000 9
Water Treatment Plant Integer, Real 527 38
Table 1: Proposed data sets
Analysis Carried Out by the Attacker on the Data Sets and Malicious Payload
The analysis to be carried out by the attacker will be broken down into several stages.
The first stage is the analysis of the Trojan payload as in Geigel (2013). The Trojan Payloads
were selected from the Exploit Database (http://www.exploit-db.com) to serve as payload.
These are given in Table 2
The main focus in the ULT payload is the frequency of occurrence of binary elements,
and that the encoding surface be as small as possible so it does not overlap with benign
clusters. On some algorithms such as K-means the size of the payload will help in moving
the cluster belonging to the malicious code further. On the other hand, the K-means will
need specific sizes to be processed on an N*N Kohonen layer since size could interfere with
the success of the compromise.
Once the payload is encoded appropriately, the analysis of modifications of the algo-
rithms to Trojanize them will be carried out. The next stage of the analysis will be the
39
process of injection of the payload into the benign data. This stage will concentrate on
analyzing the trajectories of the clusters and the measures described in the section of the
attackers’ analysis of the clusters.
Exploit Size (in bytes)
1 Linux x86 ASLR deactivation 83
2 Linux_x86 Polymorphic ShellCode - setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user
’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
124
3 OSX_Intel reverse_tcp shell x86_64 131
4 OSX/Intel - setuid shell x86_64 51
5 win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode 112
6 win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator 113
7 Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode 428
8 Windows XP SP3 English MessageBoxA Shellcode 87
Table 2: Proposed payloads
Compromising K-means Clustering Algorithms
This section introduces the compromise of the K-means clustering algorithms by an
ULT instance. A brief review of the algorithm is given to describe its main functionality.
The discussion is followed by the attack strategy to be implemented on the algorithm and
the data.
K-means clustering was first proposed by MacQueen (1967), and since then, it has
become one of the most important clustering algorithms in machine learning and data mining
fields. Its success can be attributed to its simplicity, while at the same time being very useful
for the purpose of determining the centroid on a predetermined number of clusters. The
K-means algorithm processing can be broken into the following stages:
1. Randomly initialize the centroids.
2. Assign the sample points according to: |x− µj | < |x− µk|.
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3. Calculate the new centroids using the assigned centroid and the samples closest to it using
µk =
1
Nk
ΣNkq=1xq, where q are the elements assigned to a cluster k.
4. Update cluster center based on step 3.
5. Return step 2 until convergence.
The vulnerability analysis carried out by an opponent is based on Algorithm 1 and cus-
tomization to the K-means clustering, as in Algorithm 2. The selection of cluster separation
as the trigger is based on the sample point assignment (step 2) of the K-means algorithm.
As the separation between malicious payload and the benign clusters increases, so will the
probability of attack’s success.
Algorithm 2 K-means Trojan compromise procedure
1. Use the centroid location as a trigger for the K-means Trojan. The decoding will use the
angle of the payload elements to determine the membership of elements as part of the payload
P ′.The decoding strategy will read the points in a counter clockwise manner relative to the
centroid and decode the values as the angle relative to the previous point in the cluster.
2. Identify which cluster will be used as the malicious one, and quantify the error.
3. If necessary, unbalance the data set to maximize the inter cluster distance and continue to
step 4. Else, return to step 1.
4. Compromise the target by substituting the benign code with the compromised algorithm.
5. Inject the payload to achieve the predetermined objective.
The attack’s complexity lies in that the attacker must guess the predetermined number
of clusters. Therefore, the attacker must carry out his tests under different cluster configu-
rations that he predicts the user may use. The attack may also need to be supplemented by
the use other techniques such as data poisoning, so that the data set becomes imbalanced.
The cycle will be repeated under different configurations until the attack becomes viable.
The decoding strategy will take the centroid of the compromised cluster as point of reference
on which to start a clockwise decoding sequence based on the relative angle of each previous
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point in the sequence.
Payload Encoder and Decoder for K-means Compromise
Out of the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the malicious clusters, the angle between
data points was chosen. The particular angle encoding can then be expressed in terms of
polar coordinates, specified by an angle θ and a ray r. The selection of the angle is based
on the hexadecimal code chosen as payload of the attack. Each malicious data point angle
is encoded using two hexadecimal numbers. This gives 256 possible angles for the malicious
data points. Once the angle is converted from hex to decimal representation, the length of
the ray is arbitrarily given by the adversary, and will remain fixed throughout the encoding.
From these two pieces of data, the attacker can calculate the new (x, y) coordinates by using
the following formulas:
x = r ∗ cos (θ) (19)
y = r ∗ sin (θ) (20)
A symbolic representation of this process is shown in Figure 2 (a). For the attacker,
the next step is to place the initial payload points in an offset, as shown in Figure 2 (b).
The offset will be chosen according to the feature landscape targeted for compromise.
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Encoding of: a) the malicious angle and b) offset to the starting coordinates specified by
the attacker
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An initial representation of the malicious points for the Linux x86 ASLR deactivation
Payload is shown in Figure 3. While this representation appears plausible as an attack
payload, it has a particular drawback, since the decoding sequence cannot be guaranteed
for all payload variations to be unique. Although the occurrence of such error is small, an
encoding scheme with possible zero error in encoding is preferred.
Figure 3. Representation of malicious points for Linux x86 ASLR deactivation payload
A second alternative is to rearrange the attack points to form a hull, and then center
the random points around the compromising hull. This procedure has the advantage of
including additional points to the attack vector that are used as padding for the encoding,
and can further help in attracting the cluster into the required range.
The method of constructing the compromising hull is to calculate each attack point
using an encoded angle at a distance r, as shown in Figure 4. The angle of the padding will
be calculated using the following formula:
θpadding = 360− θ + ∆ (21)
where θ is the angle to be padded and ∆ is the compensating angle. For example,
this angle can be 360, divided by the total number of the payload’s hex characters. For the
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Linux x86 ASLR deactivation Payload, ∆ = 4.337.
Figure 4. Malicious point encoded with offset and padding angle
The final result of the process described above is shown in Figure 5. The drawback
with this simple implementation is that the shape can be easily discriminated from a benign
cluster of points. A more complex extension to this algorithm is to use cubic splines (Press
et al., 1992), to make more complex hulls which also define the ∆ of each padding. For
the cubic spline alternative, r is left fixed for the purposes of recognition by the decoder
algorithm.
Figure 5. Result of hull creation for Linux x86 ASLR deactivation payload with padding points
The pseudo code for an encoder using 360 degrees as parameter for the hull shape is
given in Algorithm 3 . The code is a single procedure that takes 4 arguments: the payload
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translated from hexadecimal to decimal numbers, the initial x and y positions on which to
start the compromising hull, and the fixed ray length. Lines 5 through 10 generate the x
and y coordinates with the initial offset, and store them as previous values for the main
loop. Line 11 is the main loop. Lines 13-16 compensate for angles that are more than 180
degrees. This compensation makes it possible to achieve the surface without sub surfaces,
as in Figure 3. Lines 18-23 generate the x and y points of the payload within the load. The
points are inserted into the array at line 24, and the padding angle with its corresponding
points is generated in lines 25 through 31, and stored in line 32. The for loop is continued
until all the points have been processed, and then the procedure ends.
Algorithm 3 Payload encoder for K-means compromise
1 PROCEDURE Generate_hull_of_attack_points ( ang le l i s t in decimal form ,
2 in i t i a l_x , i n i t i a l_y , r )
3 average_angle=360/ t o t a l number o f e lements in ang le l i s t ;
4 CALL Insert_into_array (x , y )
5 x= r ∗ cos ( phi_tot∗PI /180)
6 x_vector=x+ in i t i a l_x
7 previous_xpoint=x_vector
8 y= r ∗ s i n ( phi_tot∗PI /180)
9 y_vector=y+in i t i a l_xy
10 previous_ypoint=y_vector
11 FOR each o f the ang l e s in decimal form l i s t
12 phi=cur rent ang le o f decimal l i s t
13 IF ( $phi >=180){
14 CALL Insert_into_array ( previous_xpoint , previous_ypoint )
15 phi=phi−180
16 END IF
17 phi_tota l=phi+phi_tota l
18 x= r ∗ cos ( phi_tot ∗ PI /180)
19 x_vector=x+previous_xpoint
20 previous_xpoint=x_vector
21 y= r ∗ s i n ( phi_tot ∗ PI /180)
22 y_vector=y+previous_ypoint
23 previous_ypoint=y_vector
24 CALL Insert_into_array ( x__vector , y_vector )
25 phi_tota l=−phi+average_angle+phi_tota l
26 x= r ∗ cos ( phi_tota l ∗ PI /180)
27 x_vector=x+previous_xpoint
28 previous_xpoint=x_vector
29 y= r ∗ s i n ( phi_tota l ∗ PI /180)
30 y_tmp_vector=y+previous_ypoint
31 previous_ypoint=y_vector
32 CALL i n s e r t i n to array ( x_vector , y_vector )
33 END FOR
34 END PROCEDURE
The particular decoder procedure initially takes the centroid location as a trigger for
the K-means Trojan. Another alternative is to use distance between 2 clusters as a trigger
45
for the K-means Trojan. However, if there are more than two clusters, then the measure
should be taken against the malicious cluster and each of the benign clusters individually. If
a distance reaches a threshold bigger than N, it will trigger the decoder sequence, as shown
in PROCEDURE Decoder phase1 of Algorithm 4. Once the decoder is activated it will call
the PROCEDURE Decoder phase2. This part of the code will keep executing the while
loop of line 12 until the exploit chain that holds the exploit is completed and convert the
candidates to hexadecimal. To process the chain within the while loop of line 12 calls the
procedure PROCEDURE f i n d _ n e x t _ p o i n t. This procedure will go through all
the points within the cluster boundary assigned to the centroid to determine if they are part
of the exploit.
To find if the point is part of the chain two crucial elements must be specified which
are: the initial x-y coordinates and the distance r between exploit points. The distance
between elements is calculated in lines 21 and 22 of Algorithm 4. The candidate distance is
calculated using the euclidean distance in line 25. If the result form the calculations is odd
then it is saved into the list of candidates. The even candidates that are eliminated from
the list are the ones that represent the padding angles. While these points are not relevant
to the payloads content they are part of the decoding mechanism as is shown in lines 23 and
24 where the coordinates are saved to complete the decoding process.
To get the final hexadecimal numbers the Algorithm 4 uses the inverse of the tangent
to extract the decimal representation of the hexadecimal code in lines 35 and 37. In line 37,
if phi is greater than -400 then 180 degrees are added to undo the addition of 180 degrees
of line 15 of Algorithm 3. Additional routines such as opening files and saving files must
be included as part of the decoder and must be contemplated in the overall size of the code
base that is part of the exploit. Leveraging native routines to minimize the size of the
exploit coding “surface” is essential to reduce the possibility of detection on the part of the
adversary.
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Algorithm 4 Payload decoder for K-means compromise
1 PROCEDURE Decoder phase1 ( c lu s t e r_d i s tance ,N, r , i n i t i a l x , i n i t i a l y ,
2 average angle , l i s t_of_points_from_cluster )
3 IF c lu s t e r_d i s t anc e > N
4 CALL Decoder phase2 ( r , i n i t i a l x , i n i t i a l y , average angle ,
5 l i s t_of_points_from_cluster )
6 END IF
7 END PROCEDURE
8
9 PROCEDURE Decoder phase2 ( r , i n i t i a l x , i n i t i a l y , average angle ,
10 l i s t_of_points_from_cluster )
11
12 WHILE explo i t_cha in not completed
13 phi = CALL find_next_Point ( l i s t_of_points_from_cluster , r , next_point )
14 hex_number = CALL convert_to_hex ( phi )
15 CALL store_value (hex_number )
16 END WHILE
17 END PROCEDURE
18
19 PROCEDURE find_next_point ( l i s t_of_points_from_cluster , r )
20 FOR i=1 to number o f po in t s from c l u s t e r l i s t
21 x= x coord ina te from c l u s t e r point−prev ious coordinate_x
22 y= y coord ina te from c l u s t e r point−prev ious coordinate_y
23 prev ious coordinate_x=x
24 prev ious coordinate_y=y
25 length_candidate_r=SQRT(x^2+y^2)
26 IF ( length_candidate_r = r ){
27 IF ( i=odd )
28 CALL push ( chosen_candidate_r_stack , member from l i s t )
29 ELSE
30 d i s ca rd element
31 END IF
32 END IF
33 END FOR
34 IF phi<=−400
35 phi = tan−1 ( next point_y / next point_x )
36 ELSE
37 phi =tan−1 ( next point_y / next point_x )+180
38 END IF
39 CALL El iminate_from_list ( )
40 RETURN phi
41 END PROCEDURE
The compromise, as viewed from the attacker’s perspective, first intercepts a sample
of the data that will be compromised at a future time. It is assumed that a partial capture
will hold at least some portion of the underlying distribution. The underlying assumption
is that the distribution is stationary and does not vary significantly in time. Using this
assumption and the partial capture of information, it will be viable for the attacker to
infer the underlying distribution, and therefore have an estimate of the clustering procedure
outcome. This part of the process is shown in Figure 6, using the fifth and eight column
from the first 10,000 samples of the Statlog (Shuttle) training data set. In this example, the
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attacker is assuming that the user of the K-means algorithm will use two centroids (shown
as circles in Figure 6).
Figure 6. Initial cluster results with a 10K sample of the Statlog (Shuttle) data set
The next step of the process is to encode the payload, put it on the desired coordinate
range, and insert it into the data set to see the behavior of the cluster. For this example, the
chosen exploit is the Linux x86 ASLR deactivation payload. The result is shown in Figure
7, where it is shown that payload insertion is not enough to cause a substantial movement
of the clusters. This would mean that if the attacker chooses to use as trigger the inter
distance between the two clusters, he will need additional data points to trigger the exploit,
or it might accidentally trigger if the measure presented is actually used.
Figure 7. Cluster results with a 10K sample of the Statlog (Shuttle) data with payload injected
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Figure 8. Cluster results with a 10K sample of the Statlog (Shuttle) data set with injected payload
and 400 points
To solve the problem of the centroid distance, the attacker would need to insert random
data points into the data sets, until he reaches a result such as the one shown in Figure
8. The increments were done in batches of 50 until reaching 400 data points. The random
points were generated using the following center: -67.52 in the x coordinate and -261.31 in
the y coordinate, with a maximum radius of 5. The radius size and the angles were randomly
generated and then translated into x and y coordinates.
Careful analysis will have to be carried out on the part of the adversary under a
scenario such as the one in the figures, where the inclusion of significant amount of data
points and a substantial distance could raise suspicion. A careful analysis needs to be done
by the attacker to minimize the distance needed to move the clusters, so that a reasonable
amount of points generated can move the centroid to the desired coordinate.
As an additional consideration, when compromising other variants of K-means such
as online K-means version, the attacker may leverage these additional data points to time
the execution of the payload to his advantage. Under this scenario, the attacker must also
estimate the learning rate range. This range can be reasonably be estimated by injecting
specific data and viewing the response of the learning algorithm or its user. This scenario is
plausible in intrusion detection, where the attacker can view a deny rule behavior activation
on the part of the algorithm as part of the countermeasures of a filtering system.
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Compromising Kohonen Neural Network
Kohonen Neural Network compromise presents several challenges that are not present
in the K-means compromise. To understand the intricacies of the exploit, a review of the
Kohonen Neural Network is given, followed by the compromise execution details.
The Self-Organizing Map (SOM) or Kohonen network (Kohonen, 2013, 1988) is a type
of unsupervised Hebbian (Munakata & Pfaﬄy, 2004) network that originated from the early
associative memory and adaptive learning networks, and can be used to solve clustering
problems. A typical characteristic of the Kohonen derived from its relation to Hebbian
networks is that it consists of just two layers: the input and the output or map layer.
The SOM neural network converts complex, generally high-dimensional data vectors
with N features, into (usually) a low-dimensional map. The SOM consists of two fully
connected layers of nodes: the input layer and the Kohonen layer, as shown in the figure
below.
Figure 9. Self Organizing Map
The SOM can work as both a Maxnet and Minnet, but for this presentation, a Minnet
will be assumed. The competitive learning of the SOM is related to the K-means algorithm,
as explained in Bacao et al. (2005), where the update occurs only on the winning units of
the Kohonen Neural Network.
The first phase consists on calculating the Euclidean distance given by Distancej for
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node j of the Kohonen layer:
Distancej =
n∑
i=1
(Inputi −Wold ij) (22)
Once the distance is calculated, then the next phase is to choose the winner through
a Minnet process.
As part of the competitive scheme of the Minnet in a winner take all configuration,
the network will suppress the contribution to the other nodes in the Kohonen layer output
map, while “attracting” similar nodes. This suppression and ordering through similarity is
manifested in the SOM through lateral feedback and the following learning rule:
Wnew ij = Wold ij + c · η (Inputi −Wold ij) (23)
Where W are the weights, c is a learning coefficient and η is the neighborhood function.
The original derivation of the formula is given in Kohonen (1982):
dµ
dt
= α (ξ − ξb) η (24)
where µ is the efficacy of the input weight, ξ is the presynaptic input, ξb is an effective
background value, α is a proportionality constant, and η is the post synaptic triggering
frequency. This equation yields:
µij(t+ 1) = µij(t) + αηi(t) (ξ − ξb) (25)
with η as the neighborhood function that implements the lateral feedback, and in its
simplest form, this function can assume binary values. It is set to 1 for those neurons being
positively trained and zero otherwise. This equation yields the same result as Formula 23.
The next phase is to calculate the contribution of lateral feedback on the network.
Several functions can be used to mode the lateral feedback of the SOM. The model can be
given by a crude approximation of the rectangular function:
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Rect(x) =

0 if ‖t‖ > 12
1
2 if ‖t‖ = 12
1 if ‖t‖ < 12
(26)
Another model implementation can be the Gaussian function:
f(x) = ae−
(x−µ)2
2c (27)
or the Mexican Hat function (in one dimension):
f(x) = 1− x2 · ex
2
2 (28)
A graph of each of the functions is shown in the Figure 10 below.
a) Rectangular b) Gaussian c) Mexican Hat
Figure 10. Lateral feedback function graphs
The Kohonen Neural Network presents several challenges for the encoding and inser-
tion of the payload of the malicious attack. While the attack can mimic the procedures
of the K-means by substituting the term centroid for neuron, there is a lateral feedback to
account for as an additional force that may disable the centroid distance as trigger, if not
planned properly. Since what is usually of interest after the algorithm is used is not how
well the data falls within the centroids, but how does the Kohonen layer and the weights
behave, then this requires a change in payload encoding. In order to be stealthy, the attack
must change, so that the payload is expressed in terms of these components. An alternative
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procedure is outlined in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Kohonen Trojan compromise procedure
1. Use a coordinate range on which one of the neurons may relocate after training, as a trigger
for the Kohonen Trojan. The decoding uses the angle between the nodes of the Kohonen
layer or the distances between the nodes to determine the payload P ′.
The decoding procedure depends on whether the distance or the angle is chosen.
2. Identify which nodes to be used as the malicious one, and quantify the error.
3. If necessary, calculate additional points to achieve the inter cluster distance or angle, and
continue to step 4. Else, return to step 1.
4. Compromise the target by substituting the benign code with the compromised algorithm.
5. Inject the payload to achieve the predetermined objective.
Payload Encoder and Decoder for the Kohonen Neural Network Compromise
The Kohonen Neural Network attack differs from the encoding of the K-means pay-
load. The main main difference in the algorithms is that the Kohonen algorithm acts as a
dimensionality reduction process as mentioned above, by converting high-dimensional data
vectors into (usually) a low-dimensional map. Another difference is that the clustering acts
on multiple nodes of the Kohonen layer through lateral feedback, and the training may
therefore influence more than one neuron which could be interpreted as more than one
“centroid”.
While the same encoding can be used to demonstrate the Kohonen compromise, several
factors need to be considered. First, the encoding used in the K-means algorithm duplicates
the amount of data points utilized for the compromise. This can be a drawback for the
Kohonen algorithm, where the N*N Kohonen layer might be limited to a certain size and
can compete with the benign data. To avoid this, two alternate encodings were employed for
the compromise. A second factor to take into account is that the lateral feedback and random
initialization of the clusters may destroy the order of the encoding, therefore rendering the
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compromise into a non functional one.
The first Kohonen payload encoder is shown in Algorithm 6 , where the compromise
leverages the column values to insert the payload and the sequence order. The insertion
of the payload is prety straight forward in that once the columns for the payload and the
execution counter are chosen it is a matter of generating the payload and sequence value
pair in lines 4 and 5 of the payload encoder algorithm for the SOFM. Since a new vector is
being added and it cannot be presummed that the data will consist of only two columns,
additional values are added through the function call in line 6. Finally, the function call of
line 7 inserts the compromised vector into the dataset.
Algorithm 6 Payload encoder for SOFM compromise
1 PROCEDURE Encoder_SOFM( payload_values , column_compromise ,
2 column_counter , number_of_points_to_generate )
3 FOR i=1 to number_of_points_to_generate
4 CALL insert_payload ( payload_value , column_compromise )
5 CALL insert_incrementa l_value ( column_counter )
6 CALL generate_rest_of columns_to_get_target_distance ( )
7 CALL inse r t_add i t i ona l_po in t s ( )
8 END FOR
9 END PROCEDURE
The insertion of additional points in the encoder will help in shifting the weight train-
ing towards the specific coordinate point. The corresponding decoder (Algorithm 7 ) takes
as input the final trained weights of the algorithm, the column where the sequence counter
is located, the column where the payload is located and the sequence counter initial value.
The last parameter is added since both the payload and the sequence number may be shifted
to allow positioning within the weight space formed by the SOFM. Line 3 will initiate the
reading of the weight matix, line 4 reads the values and line five will determine the resolution
of the decoder (in decimal places) where a candidate is compared to the initial value. If
the initial value falls within the tolerance of the decoder then it is recognized as the pay-
load, its corresponding payload value is also extracted from the weights and the counter is
incremented so that the routine can go to the next incremental candidate value.
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Algorithm 7 Payload decoder for SOFM compromise
1 PROCEDURE Decoder_SOFM(SOFM_weight_array , column of_incremental_value ,
2 column_of_payload , in i t i a l_counte r_va lue )
3 FOR i=1 to numberof rows −1
4 ( candidate 1 , sequence value )=CALL extract_value ( column of_incremental_value , column_of_payload )
5 CALL determine_candidate ( candidate 1 , sequence value )
6 END FOR
7 END PROCEDURE
The second attack aimed at the Kohonen Neural Network is more challenging than the
first Kohonen compromise in its execution. The payload encoder inserts the compromised
values as distance in the U-Matrix (Stefanovic & Kurasova, 2011) representation of the
Kohonen Neural Network.
The attack is aimed not at the algorithm itself, but at the visualization of the algo-
rithm’s output. A graphical representation of what the algorithm works is shown in Figure
11.
Figure 11. Graphical representation of the U-Matrix encoding compromise
Each of the entries in the U-Matrix will be constrained by the neighboring values.
To construct the U-Matrix as is shown in Figure 11, the algorithm starts from the top left
corner and goes through each row until finished. The entries can have free values which are
indicated by the outgoing arrows. These values obey the formula:
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yfree = (payloadvalue ∗ number of sides) + (xcurrent ∗ number of sides)− side values (29)
The top left corner of the figure shows the initial value R which can be the start of
the payload and is unconstrained by any value. The payload value of R can be obtained by
finding the value, which divided by two, gives the desired payload result. The values in the
first row, represented by S, have one free variable on the next row. The right hand value T
is chosen randomly to complete the three way constraint of the S values.
The same process is repeated with the other values, taking into account the number
of constraints. Once the first row is made, the center row follows, before taking the sides
represented by U and W. Finally, the second to last row is over-constrained in that if
padding is not supplied, an iterative process would have to take place to converge to a
solution. Rather than using iterative converging solutions it was opted to use padding to
simply compute the last values without the output constraint, allowing for a quick and
efficient solution to the last row problem.
Algorithms 8 and 9 represents the pseudo-code for the encoder algorithm. Line 6 of
the algorithm is responsible for generating the values for the first row values which are free
parameters in the encoding scheme. These values can be prechosen or generated randomly,
depending on the particular attack scenario. Lines 19 through 26 are designed to encode the
first value which is the R value of Figure 11 using calls to functions given in Algorithm 10.
The first step is to compute the third value using equation 29. This equation uses variables
first value and second value which are the start of the exploit and are used to calculate the
third value. Calls to get the two dimensional position into a one dimensional array and then
store the values by assignning them to the U-Matrix u_encoding
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Algorithm 8 Payload encoder for SOFM U-Matrix compromise
1 PROCEDURE Encoder_SOFM(matrix_size_x , matrix_size_y , pad_value , f i r s t_va lue , second_value , beg in ing , range )
2 matrix_minus2_x=matrix_size_x−2
3 matrix_minus2_y=matrix_size_y−2
4 ;−−generate random va lues f o r f i r s t row
5 FOR x=0 to x<matrix_minus2_x
6 values_f i rst_xrow [ x]= in t ( rand ( range ) ) +beg in ing
7 END FOR
8
9 coord inate =CALL load_attack_coordinate_array
10 payload=CALL load_attack_payload_array
11 CALL determine_if_padding_is_needed
12 u_encoding [0 ]= f i r s t_va l u e
13
14 x_rand_ctr=0
15 y_rand_ctr=0
16 FOR y=0 to y< t o t a l e n t r i e s in payload array
17 ( offset_matrix_x , of fset_matrix_y)= CALL ca l c u l a t e_o f f s e t (y , matrix_size_x , matrix_size_y )
18 ;−−−−−−corners−−−−−−−−−
19 IF ( ( of fset_matrix_y==0) AND ( offset_matrix_x==0))
20 third_value=(2∗payload [0 ])− second_value+f i r s t_va l u e+f i r s t_va l u e
21 u_encoding [0 ]= f i r s t_va l u e
22 array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , 1 , 0 )
23 u_encoding [ array_coordinate ]= third_value
24 array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , 0 , 1 )
25 u_encoding [ array_coordinate ]=second_value
26 END IF
27 ;−−−−−−−s id e s−−−−−−−
28 Else IF ( ( of fset_matrix_y==0)AND ( offset_matrix_x !=0)AND ( offset_matrix_x !=matrix_size_x −1))
29 x_right=values_f irst_xrow [ x_rand_ctr ]
30 ; f i l l in the f i r s t row va lues o f the U−Matrix one by one
31 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , offset_matrix_y ,
32 offset_matrix_x+1)]=x_right
33 x_rand_ctr++
34 x_le f t=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , offset_matrix_y ,
35 offset_matrix_x −1]
36 x_curr=u_encoding [ y ]
37 y_down=(payload [ y ]∗3)+( x_curr∗3)−x_left−x_right
38 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , of fset_matrix_y+1,
39 offset_matrix_x ]=y_down
40
41 IF offset_matrix_x==matrix_size_x−2
42 x_curr=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
43 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x −1)]
44 payload_value=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
45 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x −1) ] ]
46 x_le f t =u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
47 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x−2]
48 y_down=(payload_value ∗2)+(x_curr∗2)− x_le f t
49 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
50 offset_matrix_y+1, matrix_size_x−1]=y_down
51 END IF
52
53 END IF
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Algorithm 9 Continuation of payload encoder for SOFM U-Matrix compromise
1 Else IF ( ( of fset_matrix_y !=0) AND ( offset_matrix_y !=matrix_size_y ) AND ( offset_matrix_x !=0)
2 AND ( offset_matrix_x !=matrix_size_x −1))
3 x_curr=u_encoding [ y ]
4 y_up=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , offset_matrix_y −1,
5 offset_matrix_x ]
6 x_le f t=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , offset_matrix_y ,
7 offset_matrix_x −1]
8 x_right=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , offset_matrix_y ,
9 offset_matrix_x+1]
10 y_down=(payload [ y ]∗4)+( x_curr∗4)−x_left−x_right−y_up
11 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , of fset_matrix_y+1,
12 offset_matrix_x ]=y_down
13
14 IF ( offset_matrix_x==matrix_size_x−2){
15 ;−−−−−−− f i r s t entry o f the row
16 x_curr=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
17 offset_matrix_y , 0 ]
18 payload_value=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
19 offset_matrix_y , 0 ]
20 y_up=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
21 offset_matrix_y −1, 0 ]
22 x_right =u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
23 offset_matrix_y , 1 ]
24 y_down=(payload_value ∗3)+(x_curr∗3)−x_right−y_up
25 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
26 offset_matrix_y+1,0]=y_down
27
28 ;−−−−−−− l a s t entry o f the row
29 x_curr=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
30 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x−1]
31 payload_value=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
32 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x−1]
33 y_up=u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
34 offset_matrix_y −1, matrix_size_x−1]
35 x_le f t =u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
36 offset_matrix_y , matrix_size_x−2]
37 y_down=(payload_value ∗3)+(x_curr∗3)−x_left−y_up
38 u_encoding [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x ,
39 offset_matrix_y+1,matrix_size_x−1]=y_down
40 END IF
41
42 END IF
43
44 END FOR
45
46 END PROCEDURE
The process of filling the entire matrix follows the same same format as the calculation
for the R value of value of Figure 11 with the exception that as the matrix progresses the
algorithm has to extract previous calculated values. each one of the quadrants in the Figure
11 is covered by exceptions specified in IF conditionals. The routine keeps executing through
the for loop until all values are entered into the U-Matrix.
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Algorithm 10 Support procedures for payload encoder for SOFM U-Matrix compromise
1 PROCEDURE ca l c u l a t e_o f f s e t ( calc_value , x_value )
2 of fset_value_x= calc_value% x_value ;
3 of fset_value_y= calc_value / x_value ;
4 re turn ( of fset_value_x , i n t ( of f set_value_y ) ) ;
5 END PROCEDURE
6
7
8 PROCEDURE get_array_pos it ion (y_pos , x_size , x_pos )
9 array_pos= y_pos∗ x_size+ x_pos ;
10 re turn array_pos ;
11 END PROCEDURE
12
13 PROCEDURE rand_range
14 re turn i n t ( srand ( y − x ) ) + x ;
15 END PROCEDURE
16
17 PROCEDURE determine_if_padding_is_needed
18 mat_size= matrix_size_x∗ matrix_size_y ;
19 IF tot< mat_size
20 last_value_ctr= coord inate [ tot −1]+1;
21 d i f f= mat_size− to t ;
22 FOR x=0 to x< d i f f
23 push ( payload , pad_value ) ;
24 push ( coord inate , last_value_ctr ) ;
25 last_value_ctr= last_value_ctr+1;
26 End FOR
27 Else IF $tot>$mat_size
28 d i e "matrix s i z e i s too smal l f o r payload"
29 END IF
30 END PROCEDURE
The decoder shown in Algorithm 11 is just the formula for the U-Matrix which for
the center values is given by the formula:
Payloadvalue =
(xright − current+ xleft − current+Xup − current+Xdown − current)
4
(30)
An additional element to pass to the decoder is the location of the sub rectangle that
composes the payload. This will give the position of the payload within the Kohonen layer
and will instruct the decoder on where to look for the sub matrix. As with the Encoder the
algorithm is divided into the sections of Figure 11 by the IF conditions within the algorithm.
The For loops in lines 2 and 3 iterate through each element of the array and depending on
the position within the matrix it will process Equation 30 with the appropriate number of
sides and store it in a variable distance which can then be used as the value of the payload.
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Algorithm 11 SOFM payload decoder U-Matrix compromise
1 PROCEDURE Decoder_SOFM(matrix_size_x , matrix_size_y , coord inate , payload )
2 For y=0 to y<matrix_size_y
3 For x=0 to x<matrix_size_x
4 array_coordinate=get_array_pos it ion matrix_size_x , y , x
5 cur rent=payload [ array_coordinate ]
6 IF x==0 AND y==0
7 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
8 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
9 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent + y_down−cur rent )/2
10 End IF
11 IF x!=0 AND x!=matrix_size_x−1 AND y==0
12 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
13 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
14 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
15 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent+x_left−cur rent+y_down−cur rent )/3
16 End IF
17 IF x == matrix_size_x−1 AND y==0
18 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
19 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
20 d i s t=(x_left−cur rent + y_down−cur rent )/2
21 End IF
22 IF x == 0 AND y!=0 AND y!=matrix_size_y−1
23 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
24 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
25 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate = CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
26 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent + y_up−cur rent + y_down−cur rent ) / 3 ;
27 End IF
28 IF x!=0 && y!=0 AND x!=matrix_size_x−1 AND y!=matrix_size_y−1
29 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
30 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
31 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
32 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
33 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent + x_left−cur rent + y_up−cur rent + y_down−cur rent )/4
34 End IF
35 IF y!=0 AND x==matrix_size_x−1 AND y!=matrix_size_y−1
36 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
37 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
38 y_down=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y+1,x ) ]
39 d i s t=(x_left−cur rent + y_up−cur rent + y_down−cur rent )/3
40 End IF
41 IF x==0 AND y==matrix_size_y−1
42 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
43 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
44 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent + y_up−cur rent ) / 2 ;
45 End IF
46 IF y==matrix_size_y−1 AND x!=0 AND x!=matrix_size_x−1
47 x_right=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x+1)]
48 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
49 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
50 d i s t=(x_right−cur rent + x_left−cur rent + y_up−cur rent )/3
51 End IF
52 IF y==matrix_size_y−1 AND x==matrix_size_x−1
53 x_le f t=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y , x−1)]
54 y_up=payload [ array_coordinate=CALL get_array_pos it ion (matrix_size_x , y−1,x ) ]
55 d i s t= ( x_left−cur rent + y_up−cur rent )/2
56 End IF
57 End For
58 End For
59
60 END PROCEDURE
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Compromising Adaptive Resonance Algorithm
Adaptive Resonance Theory, developed by Stephen Grossberg, is a family of supervised
and unsupervised algorithms (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1998):
• ART1- is an unsupervised model that is “capable of self-organizing, self-stabilizing,
and self-scaling its recognition codes in response to arbitrary temporal sequences and arbi-
trarily many input patterns of variable complexity” (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987b).
• ART2- is the “class of adaptive resonance architectures which rapidly self-organize
categories in response to arbitrary sequences of either analog or binary input patterns”
(Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987a).
The current work will concentrate only on the ART1 algorithm that consists of two layers
that are fully connected and use binary representation for both layers. The layers are called
F1 and F2, for the first and second layers, respectively. There are forward connections from
each neuron of F1 to each of the neurons at the F2 layer via forward weights WFij , as
shown in Figure 12. The same is done from all neurons at F2 to neurons at F1 via WBij .
The initial architecture starts as in Figure 12 a), where there are no neurons at the F2 layer.
In addition, there are two gain subsystems that control the neural network behavior. The
network is initialized to F2 = 0, if no previous data has been shown to the network. The
initial values of WFij are chosen randomly, such that:
0 < WF <
L
(L− 1) + |M | (31)
where M is the number of nodes representing the input vector, and the constant L >
1. The vigilance parameter ρ is set to the desired value. The weights of WB are all set to 1.
A high vigilance value will yield a highly selective clustering, producing clusters of tightly
coupled members. A lower vigilance parameter value will results in more general clusters,
and will be less discriminative.
61
The steps to execute the neural network are as follows:
Step 1: For each input, do:
f1→ f2 =
inputs∑
i=1
WF · fi(0,1)(X, gain, feedback) (32)
The input function f0,1 takes as arguments three parameters: the inputs X, the gain,
and the feedback. The gain is the result of two individual gain mechanisms: Gain 1 and
Gain 2. Gain 2 is the logical or of the inputs X, such that:
Gain2 =

1 if or X 6= 0
0 if or X = 0
(33)
The output of Gain 1 is given by:
Gain1 =

1 if inputs 6= 0 andT = 0
0 if x < σ
(34)
where T is the logical or of the outputs t. The feedback is the amount of the nodej
at F2 with the corresponding weight that points to the input node being calculated. The
feedback is more formally expressed as:
feedbacki =
M∑
j=1
WB · t (35)
From the three inputs: X, gain, feedback, the activated nodes will be the ones that
pass the 2/3 rule, in which at least two of the three components must be present in order
to activate. This means that at least the gain or the feedback must activate the neuron.
Step 2: From this, select the output node that has the biggest output, such that:
Max (f1→ f2) (36)
Step 3: The selected node will then go through the vigilance test, which evaluates the
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closeness of the input pattern to the stored “ideal pattern of the node”:
∑inputs
i=1 WF · f0,1(X, gain, feedback)∑
x
> ρ (37)
Step 4: If the node fails the vigilance test, then mask the node as unavailable, and
pick the runner up. Repeat this step, until a node passes the vigilance test. Should all
neurons fail the test, then create a new node.
Step 5: For the winner node, do the training with:
WFij =
L · fi(0,1)(X, gain, feedback)
L− 1 +∑ f(0,1)(X, gain, feedback) and tij = fi(0,1)(X, gain, feedback) (38)
a) ART1 starting state b) ART1 with nodes in F2
Figure 12. Adaptive Resonance Theory network
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Payload Encoder and Decoder for the Adaptive Resonance Algorithm Compromise
The attack on Adaptive Resonance differs substantially from the previous two attacks
in that the processing carried out by ART1 is binary in nature. The encoding of the payload
is broken into two main segments: the payload itself and an ordering part. The ordering
part is essential in case the strings arrive at the algorithm in different order. Figure 13shows
three possible alternatives to encode the payload and the order.
Figure 13. Encoding layout of payload and order
The encoder for the Adaptive Resonance payload is given in Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12 Payload encoder for Adaptive Resonance compromise
PROCEDURE Encoder_ART( l ist_of_hex_characters_payload , sequence , data_sample )
CALL insert_payload ( payload_value , column_to_compromise )
CALL insert_incrementa l_value ( column_counter , column_to_compromise )
CALL Insert_zero_value_padding ( column_to_compromise )
CALL convert_dataset_to_binary ( compromised_data_sample )
END PROCEDURE
One particular difference in the encoding process using Algorithm 12 is that it requires
more trial and error on the part of the attacker to achieve a particular payload encoding.
The formula for the division of clusters may yield multiple compromised clusters which
may make the attack cumbersome in nature. However, the decoder for the ART1 payload is
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simpler in nature, than the other decoders mentioned thus far, and is given in the Algorithm
13.
Algorithm 13 Payload decoder for the Adaptive Resonance compromise
PROCEDURE Decoder_ART( sequence column_id , datase t column , start ing_value , payload_size )
CALL Sort_column ( datase t column )
CALL Ident i fy_star t_va lue ( s tart ing_value , sequence _column)
; r e tu rn s o f f s e t to s ta r t ing_va lue in sequence column
FOR j= s ta r t i ng_va lue_o f f s e t to payload_size va lue
IF sorted_column_value_at_offset == i
CALL extract_compromised Column_value ( )
END IF
END FOR
END PROCEDURE
The selected encoding for the tests carried out for this thesis was the order-payload
sequence encoding. While in other compromises random numbers can be generated based
on information from the sample distribution, in Adaptive Resonance this can be counter
productive. The additional data elements inserted into the columns can lead to a detrimental
discrimination in Adaptive Resonance. For the tests carried out a zero value entry in each
binary value was selected as method of padding the payload.
Experimental Setup for the Attack Simulation
To carry out the scenario outlined above, it assumes that the attacker has a well
established methodology for analyzing the behavior of the data under study. The attacker
must also have a measurement of effectiveness that maximizes the probability of success of
the attack, while maintaining the clusters as close as possible, to avoid arousing suspicion.
An additional requirement is that the attacker must find a way to simulate more data
for the attack scenario, to test the payload injection and triggering of the attack. If he
does not have access to a sample, then the attacker could assume a random distribution.
However, this simulation works under the reasonable assumption that an attacker has access
to intercepted or obtained data sample.
Another reasonable assumption is that the intercepted or obtained data is just a sub-
sample of the underlying distribution that will be processed by the algorithm. A possibility
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for the attacker is to leverage the obtained sample to generate additional samples. While
bootstrapping (P. Cohen, 1995) can be an effective way to generate additional training sets,
it does not necessarily meet the particular requirements for the evaluation of the attack’s
effectiveness. An alternative is to generate the data set as bootstrap, but with an additional
generation consisting of perturbed data points. From this, two alternatives can immediately
be utilized to test an attack’s effectiveness:
• No addition of points to serve as a baseline.
• Based on the datapoints, use a normal distribution to distribute the random points.
The second option is based on obtaining the mean of each of the dimensions of the data
points, and then use the first, second, and third standard deviations to create the additional
random points.
The proposed experimental setup is outlined to simulate the attacker’s setup and
actual attack:
1. Divide into training and testing using a 20-80 rule or similar ratio, respectively. This will
simulate reasonable real scenarios of an attacker capturing partial information gathered by
the user of the unsupervised learning algorithm. If the data set contains a testing and
training set, they must meet these parameters. If training set exceeds this ratio, elements
will be eliminated randomly from the training set until the ratio is met.
2. Calculate the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation from the obtained set to
be used as training.
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3. From the selected set used as training, generate a training set using the bootstrap method
and generate a second one to use as the baseline. For the Bootstrap data set, randomly
generate additional n elements on the first, second, and third standard deviations using
the mean deviation for the first technique, using 68–27–5.7 percentages of the standard
deviations percentages of this distribution. A baseline of no additional elements will first
be run, followed by the two techniques generating the random elements, using the total
number of elements of the test set. This particular number of samples is given under the
assumption that the attacker can estimate the number of samples to be processed, but
does not have access to the particular set of elements to be processed by the algorithm at
testing.
4. Insert the malicious data into the benign data set serving as training.
5. Process the payload through the decoder, to see if it decodes.
6. Perform the attacker’s analysis of the ULT Density Problem. Evaluate the result taking into
account additional constraints such as stealthiness of the candidate solution and the ULT
density measurements.
7. Tweak the solution until satisfied or until a candidate solution emerges from the training
runs.
8. Repeat the procedure using different data sets and different parameters.
9. Run the malicious payload against the test set, record the results as success or failure on
triggering the payload, and whether the decoder succeeds or not.
10. Carry out significance tests for the results obtained.
The step 10 of the proposed experimental method makes two measurements that can benefit
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from the quantification and use of significance test (Wackerly et al., 2002). The first one will
evaluate the use of a particular attack on a particular shared data set between algorithms.
The encodings that are used on each of the algorithms vary substantially and there is a need
to know if a particular encoding is more efficient than another. The assumption tested uses
three particular algorithms, four different malicious payload encodings, and different data
sets for the tests. Under the described test conditions where three classifiers are used and no
assumptions can be made to justify ANOVA (Demsar, 2006), statistical significance testing
is done using the Friedman nonparametric test.
The second measurement carried out is the use of a baseline of just the obtained data,
set as opposed to generating additional samples to approximate the actual scenario of the
compromise. The assumption used to justify the test of significance is that while there are
three different algorithms, the comparison will be made under the same parameters and the
same data sets. The only difference between the tests will be the addition of samples for
the non baseline test. The parametric test under this assumption would be equivalent to
two different classifiers (Demsar, 2006). Under these conditions, the statistical evaluation
selected is the Wilcoxon signed ranked test.
To standardize results for the data sets for all tests with the exception of the Adaptive
Resonance algorithm, the distances of the payloads were arranged so that either:
1. The complete payload stays outside the 1st standard deviation in at least one of
the tests.
2. Half of the payload values fall within the 3rd and standard deviation in at least
one of the tests.
3. The payload falls completely within the right tail of standard deviation and the
minimum value on the left tail of the distribution.
This standardization will help in making a consistent result tabulation for the hypoth-
esis testing. The Adaptive resonance algorithm exception will be discussed below.
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For the K-means, the fourth step will be based on one of the three case scenarios above,
and consists on generating a random coordinate, which will become the malicious cluster
centroid’s initial placement. The attacker will calculate the DS, the DCD, and DyTrojan for
the setup on step 6. Optimization will be tested to see if the trigger of the payload on step
5 is adequate. This will be adjusted repeatedly, as stated in step 7 and as needed, until the
attacker is confident that he has obtained a viable solution. The process will be repeated
for three random coordinates.
The process will be repeated using the KEGG Metabolic, Statlog (Shuttle), and Water
Treatment data sets, using payloads 2, 3 and 7 from Table 2. The KEGG Metabolic data set
the data was divided into a 20-80 ratio which is 10,683 for training and 42,730 of the 53,413
samples in that data set. The Statlog (Shuttle) data set was divided into 2,900 random
samples chosen from the training file and the full test data of 14500 samples for the test run.
Finally Water Treatment data set was processed using only Fpv Close,High, Bypass, Bpv
Close, and Bpv Open columns with 105 samples for training and 422 samples for testing.
All the 18 tests carried out for the K-means algorithm were done using 2 clusters on
the first two columns of the data sets. In the final step, the tests were run and significance
tests were made to see if there was a difference between the ratios.
The Kohonen Neural Network attack testing will be similar to the K-means compro-
mise attack with some changes. On step 1, the percentage will be approximately 27-73 ratio
due to the small sizes of the selected data set. On step 4, the attacker will use the generated
malicious data to move the nodes of the Kohonen layer into the appropriate coordinates.
From there, the attacker will calculate the DS, the DCD, and DY for the setup. The
measurements will be accompanied by the payload tests in step 4 to see if the decoder func-
tions properly. The process of the Kohonen compromise is repeated and adjusted to find
the number of elements that make the nodes move to the precise coordinates. The DS will
determine if an actual error occurs; and the DCD and DY will help in determining if the
chosen distance has a probability of failure. These values will help determine the amount of
tolerance for the decoder.
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The process of improving the Kohonen layer movement of points is refined by repeating
the process by using different random coordinates and 2 of the payloads to be minimized.
The malicious payload is then used against the test set, the results recorded as success or
failure on triggering the payload, and whether the decoder succeeds or not. The results
of these tests will then be validated using tests of significance using the non parametric
Friedman test on preselected ratios, to see if the increase in ratios is significant. The Null
hypothesis states that there is no difference between using different ratios.
The selected data sets for the Kohonen Neural Network attack simulation are: KEGG
Metabolic, Power Consumption, and Water Treatment using the payloads 5 and 6 from Table
2. The data sample sizes for the Kohonen algorithm were restricted to random samples sizes
of 200 for the training set, but were limited to 560 samples for the testing in the KEGG
Metabolic and Power Consumption data sets due to processing time restrictions. For the
water treatment data set, the 105 sample size for the training set was used alongside 422
instances for the test set.
The Adaptive Resonance experimental setup somewhat deviates from the other two
algorithms due to its binary nature. Given the particular clustering of Adaptive Resonance,
a first run will test the point were zero error is made at .1 vigilance parameter setting; and
then a Gaussian number generator will be used to select 2 numbers around this value to see
how the vigilance varies. If the samples vary, then the one with the highest DCD will be
chosen as representative for the test run.
The offset of the payload from the benign data is determined on zero based error given
the vigilance parameter. The DS reads 0 because there are no errors in the payload in a
discrete cluster that has been fully separated. The DY will also reach a steady state within
the same sample and depends on the volume of the cluster being described. This process
is done using two of the specified payloads to be minimized. Besides the difference due to
the measurements, the rest of the procedure steps are the same as the ones described above
for the use of the KEGG Metabolic and Statlog (Shuttle) data sets, using payloads 8 and 4
from Table 2. The data set sizes and column selections for the Adaptive Resonance training
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and testing followed the same specifications as the K-means algorithm.
Quantifying and Scoring the Results of the Training and Testing Data
This section is aimed at explaining the quantifying and scoring of the results reported
in the experimental results chapter and Appendices B through E. The section is divided into
three parts. The first part is an overview of the evaluation format of the appendices, the
second is the training evaluation, and finally, the evaluation of the test data.
The evaluation format of the experimental runs given in the appendices is provided
in a table format, and is divided into the training results and the test results. The table
section belonging to the training starts with the sample’s basic statistics such as min/max
values, mean and standard deviation. The sample statistics display basic measures from
which to compare the samples of the training and the test runs. The statistics reported for
the sample consist mainly on the columns that are used in the compromise. The other tables
are not reported, since depending on the attack, they can be considered noise or simply do
not provide any measurable difference to the results.
The sample statistics are followed by the three samples’ positions with regards to the
sample space where the compromise is taking place. The positions are usually given in
terms of the offsets to start the payload and sequence order. The sequence is located in
the first column of the selected data set. The second coordinate is that of the value used
as offset to start the payload encoding embedded in the second column of the selected data
set. Afterwards, each sample’s use of additional points, additional payload data elements,
DS, DCD, DYTrojan, and DYBenign are reported. The number of additional points column
is not utilized if the runs are part of the baseline training. The additional payload column
is not utilized in Adaptive Resonance, instead it is utilized to report the specific vigilance
parameter used for the training run.
The DS, DCD, DYTrojan, and DYBenign are reported for each training run and
utilized in the evaluation of the training run. The only measurement that is excluded in the
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evaluation criteria for all runs is the DYBenign. The rationale for the exclusion lies in that
while this property is useful in providing a sense of the training set distribution, it was found
not to be an effective indicator as the other measurements, due to the low ratio of intercepted
messages utilized in the process. As the adversary gathers more information about the final
distribution, then the measurement can become more reliable and more important in the
decision process.
The testing report is similar to that of the training starting with the testing data’s
basic statistics. The statistics are followed by the DS, DCD, DYTrojan and DYBenign
measurements. Finally, a confusion matrix for the test run is provided to quantify the error
in the test run. While the DS provides a basic error reporting, the confusion matrix provides
a more detailed information on where the error occurred.
The measurement’s interpretation taken during the training phase of the compromise
will depend on the particular goal of the attacker. If the attacker’s goal is to provide
stealthiness, then particular care needs to be taken in interpreting the ULT DS, DCD,
and DY measurements. These formulas for documenting the ULT measurements are aimed
at discriminating the payload from the benign data. Under such assumption, the cluster
measurements will tend to favor compromises in which the attack may be considered an
outlier and therefore draw attention. To take into account stealthiness, a tradeoff has to be
made between guaranteeing the execution of the payload and the stealthiness factor of the
attack. The additional payload represents additional data elements that are injected to bias
the centroids towards the desired outcome.
For the K-means and Kohonen algorithms training the following scoring of each indi-
vidual run was done using the information shown in Table 3:
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DS, DCD, DY Additional Payload Distance to Mean
Best Result Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Closest
Highest Points Awarded 3 3 3 3*1.5 3*2
Lowest Points Awarded 1 1 1 1*1.5 1*2
Table 3: K-means and Kohonen scoring criteria
The scoring criteria tries to balance the measurement’s objective of cluster discrim-
ination and the need to remain less detectable. The two additional evaluation criteria of
awarding points for compromising the data set with the least amount of additional malicious
points and the closeness to the mean bring the desired tradeoff between cluster discrimina-
tion and detectability. The evaluation criteria also took into consideration when two runs
had the same outcome on each individual measurement. Under such circumstance, a value
of 1.5 or 2.5 was awarded, depending on whether the tie was for first or second place.
An additional consideration in the K-means algorithm run evaluation was the mis-
classification assignment. The evaluation consisted on granting a misclassified status of the
benign cluster if both centroids fell inside the payload circle. Similarly, if both centroids fell
outside the circle of the payload, then the payload is misclassified as benign. The rationale
for this evaluation criteria consisted in the algorithm’s goal to move the centroids and not
the data, therefore the evaluation rested not on the data location, but on the centroids’
location. While this evaluation criteria was the selected one, there are other criteria that
can be used, such as quantifying the data points that were misplaced based on the Euclidean
distance to the centroids. The complication would then be on determining which centroid
is considered benign or malicious in a predetermined fashion.
For the Kohonen algorithm, the rules of classification were made based on a threshold
value. If the benign neuron or weight fell within the integer value of the encoding for the
payload, then the point was misclassified as malicious. In contrast, if a point did not reach
convergence, then it was misclassified as benign.
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As opposed to the K-means and Kohonen algorithm, the Adaptive Resonance can-
didate selection algorithm varied considerably. As previously mentioned, since Adaptive
Resonance is based on a binary classification without preselection of the number of clusters,
the measurements selected for the other two algorithms would not give accurate results.
As an alternative, the procedure for Adaptive Resonance was done by choosing the closest
distance to the cluster, since the encoding will be affected and turned into a longer binary
sequence that can be easily detectable upon inspection. The selection criteria was based on
randomly selecting the vigilance parameter with a value between 0.01 and 0.10 , a value at
0.10, and a value between 0.10 and 0.20. The winner was selected based on which value
obtained the zero result with the lowest offset in the payload column. This minimum offset
provided the encoding values tested on a randomly selected vigilance parameter.
Discussion of Possible Real World Scenarios
This provides a discussion of further considerations of the attack under a real world
scenario. The discussion focuses on initial compromise scenarios, distribution channels,
and advantages of certain programming languages in hiding the compromise. Each of the
different unsupervised learning algorithms is used under certain scenarios, and the imple-
mentations of the ULT will vary to accommodate changes in environment.
The ULT attack instances are considered to be possible under two particular scenarios
which the simulations carried out try to capture. The first scenario considers an attack by
an internal agent that has access to the programming or hardware configuration of an orga-
nization that uses learning algorithms for the analysis of its data. This scenario reinforces
the notion of Kerckhoffs’ Principle discussed in the review of literature. Under this scenario,
the attacker has complete access to the information, providing a scenario in which the end
user of the algorithm cannot not rely on expectations of secrecy, since the information is
shared or can even be generated by an attacker.
The second scenario contemplates an attacker that distributes the software himself.
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The attacker will either portray himself as a distributor of the software or modify an exist-
ing distribution channel for an existing unsupervised learning software. Again, under this
scenario, it is the attacker who is providing the software and can alter the software and even
the supplied data, if the conditions are appropriate.
The capacity of the end user noticing the compromises will depend on the auditing
done periodically on the source code and the experience of the user with the data that he
processes. In terms of the programming, the detection will depend on the specific activation
routine and the lines of code necessary to carry out the decoding and execution of the
payload. Some implementations, such as with a compiled language programming, can be
extremely difficult to detect once the application is compiled. Interpreted languages and
accessibility to source code will be more amenable to evaluation.Also, a forensic analysis
may yield discovery of the compromise.
Depending on the end user’s experience and the particular activation and decoding
used in the ULT, if the attacker also needs to unbalance the data set excessively through
additional compromised data points to carry out the attack, the user may be able to notice
the discrepancy with previous results. As the benign data and the payload deviate from
the usual data patterns for the particular problem domain, the easier it will be to spot the
attack.
Resources
The resources used for the dissertation work consist of computing and software re-
sources, and data sets processed. Each of the three resource types are discussed below.
The computing resources used to carry out the proposed work consist of a workstation
with a Pentium i7 processor, 9 GB RAM, and a 500 GB storage capacity.
Necessary software resources are: preprocessing and insertion of payload, unsupervised
learning programs, and post processing software to quantify and visualize the results. The
unsupervised learning software was programmed in C language and compiled with the GCC
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compiler, running on Fedora Linux. The preprocessing and insertion of the payload into the
unsupervised learning algorithms was programmed using PERL for easy of modification and
evaluation. Visualization primarily consists of custom scripts with GNUPlot and LibreOffice
Calc charts.
Summary
This chapter has introduced the unsupervised Learning Trojan Density Problem,
where the attacker does not have control of a training set. This implies that the parameters
of the attack have to be estimated, instead of learned, and the problem is now expressed in
terms of the density estimation of the distributions. Under this scenario, the chapter has
introduced the question of whether an unsupervised algorithm is capable of discriminating
between unlabeled malicious samples and the benign data.
The material covered several techniques that the attacker can use to measure the
progress and the quality of the attack. As the narrative continues, a cluster identification
sub problem is presented, which inquires the reliable identification of the malicious cluster
from those identified by the algorithm as benign.
The chapter also covered the payload activation and encoding strategy used in these
types of attacks. The chapter narrative then provided the three algorithms and the four data
sets to be used in the experiments. Eight payloads were specified to carry out the attacks.
The algorithms, data sets, and payloads in the provided experimental setup produce the
following: 18 test runs on the K-means algorithm, 12 on the Kohonen Neural Network, and
12 runs on ART-1. The chapter included the procedures and the particular encodings utilized
for each of the algorithms, and provided the necessary experimental setup and resources to
carry out the experiments under this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
Results
Experimental Results for K-Means
This section provides a discussion of the results obtained from the experiments
carried out with the K-means algorithm on the KEGG Metabolic, Statlog (Shuttle),
and Water Treatment data sets, using the Linux_x86 Polymorphic ShellCode - se-
tuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd, OSX_Intel re-
verse_tcp shell x86_64 and the Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode as pay-
loads. The particular results for each of the 18 baseline and additional benign datapoints
experiments are shown in Appendix A. All the results obtained were done using a Gaussian
random number generator for the coordinates and uniform random number of additional
payload coordinates.
The overall results for the 18 data sets are summarized in Figure 14. The results are
based on the centroids being classified as either malicious or non malicious for the purposes
of activating the payload, based on lines 3-7 of the decoder shown in Algorithm 4. The focus
of the results were concentrated on this part of the decoder, since it is the part that is most
prone to failure and it is the one that depends on the actual K-means algorithm.
Figure 14. Summary of confusion matrix results for the K-means compromise
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As can be seen from Figure 14, the addition of benign data points surpassed the
baseline in terms of performance during the test runs carried out. A big percentage of the
errors in the baseline came from not being able to activate the payload, due to having the
centroid fall outside of the hull formed by the malicious payload data points.
The second part of the decoder, which obtains the hex numbers from the hull points is
more resistant to failure and it does not rely on K-means itself. During the tests carried out,
all trials successfully decoded the payload with a resolution of 4 decimal places. The results
obtained can be explained by the fact that the decoder relies on the spread of the data on
a torus described by a thin shell  along a radius r and that the hull points inside the thin
shell  did not overlap with benign data points. The possibility of payload decoding failure
once it is activated may be due to a mistaken data point that is classified as malicious in
line 24 of Algorithm 4. This failure can be described as a benign point falling on the thin
shell  as shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Volume of thin shell for the decoding string
The total area of the encoding region is given by the radius r of the two coordinates
used in the description of the payload. The radius r is used to determine the inner boundary
of the shell , whose length is determined by the decoding resolution of the implemented
algorithm. As the decoder resolution increases in the decimal values needed to fall as an
accurate representation of the radius, the  shell decreases in volume and the more robust
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the algorithm becomes with respect to possible failure. That is to say, if the resolution of
the decoder is just one decimal place, the length of  is bigger than if the resolution of the
decoder is 4 decimal places. Having a benign data point fall in the exact place with four
decimal places is more difficult than having a benign point being misclassified by using just
one decimal place.
The increased resistance to failure of the second part of the decoder is offset by the
activation part of the payload. The results of Figure 14 can also be analyzed by the obtained
DD values. A point of inquiry is whether the DS value from the selected sample during
training correlates with the outcome of the test result. The DS values for the selected
configuration against the DS obtained during the testing run is shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Comparison of DS value for selected configuration against the test run
The figure shows that there were only two instance where the DS for the training
was zero; and for the test run, it was nonzero. Alternatively, there are three instances
where the training DS was nonzero, and the test error is zero. The overall accuracy for the
procedure is 33 percent error free. On the other hand, taking in as error only the instances
where there was no detectable error in the training and error in the testing, gives an overall
training selection accuracy of 72.2 percent. Based on this last finding, it was investigated
if there were any correlation between training and testing outcomes. The r correlation
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coefficient was calculated to measure the degree of correlation between the two variables.
The result indicated a moderate to strong relationship with a score of 0.795 score. While
the measurement was relatively high no clear trend line was discernible from the gathered
data that could provide further indication of correlation as shown in the Figure 17.
Figure 17. Plot of Training vs Testing DS of K-means Compromise
While the reported training selection accuracy was relatively high for the DS value
where there was no detectable error in the training and error in the testing and strong
correlation which is what an adversary is looking for, care must be taken with this inter-
pretation. The first concern is that there was no clear trend line and the second is that the
DS is an indicator of the overall confusion matrix error but it does not provide the type of
error that occurred during the training and testing to see if the error types were the same.
This is important, since there can be cases where the benign data cluster falls within the
malicious boundary and may cause misclassification, but the malicious centroid fell within
the boundary and depending on the attack composition, may have activated the payload.
This type of error interpretation will depend on how the compromise is setup and if it is
relevant to the activation of the attack itself.
Several factor can contribute to the results obtained in the training and test results.
These include the specific data set used as well as the payload that was inserted into the
data. Looking at the error in terms of the data sets that were used, it can be seen in Figure
18that the none of the data sets produced zero error in either their baseline or the additional
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benign datapoint insertion. While the Stalog Shuttle data set produced fewer errors it is
not substantial to assert any statement on the relative performance advantage of the data
set.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 18. Errors for (a) KEGG Metabolic (b) Water Treatment (c) Stalog Shuttle data sets
The breakdown by data sets did not show significant differences in behavior, due to
the sample sizes being too small to draw any definite conclusion, and should be further
explored to determine their impact. These results contrast with some moderate differences
that were found when considering the analysis by type of malware as shown in Figure 19.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 19. Errors from (a) Linux_x86 Polymorphic ShellCode (b) OSX_Intel reverse_tcp shell
x86_64 (c) Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
The results for the Linux_x86 Polymorphic ShellCode showed that all attempt on
the baseline configuration resulted in nonzero error. A possible explanation for this result
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is that this particular payload has the least amount of bytes of the three attacks selected,
which implies less data points in the intended malicious cluster. The non baseline result for
the Polymorphic ShellCode shows a performance difference in the three trial runs that were
executed. The same can be said in the opposite case for the baseline error for the Windows
XP PRO SP3, where the baseline error in all three instances was zero. Again, while these
results are not conclusive, they yield some preliminary explanations on the behavior of the
compromises.
The training set behavior yields useful information on the behavior of the compromises
with respect to the data set by using the DS and the DCD as measures of compromise
behavior. As shown in the Figure 20, as the DCD becomes higher, the DS becomes very
low.
Figure 20. DCD and DS plot of the KEGG Metabolic and Shuttle data sets for the K-means
compromise training. Size of symbols represent additional malicious elements added to move the
clusters
This behavior was also seen in the Water Treatment aset showing a trend that is
consistent with the theory that as the DCD becomes higher there should be a lower DS.
Another interesting pattern is that due to the way the error was calculated, there is a center
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gap between 0.4 and 0.6. This pattern can be expected to vary depending on the error
quantification strategy selected. The inclusion of additional payload elements is shown in
Figure 20 represented by the size of the shapes in the figure. No discernible pattern was
reflected in the executed runs carried out during the training. The figure also shows that
the Shuttle data set has a bigger spread in values of the DCD with respect to the KEGG
Metabolic data set. The water treatment had a bigger spread than both the KEGG and
shuttle data set with respect to the DCD indicating that significant variability in the DCD
can be expected among data sets.
An important point to take into consideration is the value of the DS during additional
point insertion on the training phase. As shown in this example, from Table 25 of Appendix
A, the DS measurement can give the wrong impression due to the number of additional
elements added to simulate an additional benign data set.
Figure 21. Example of possible failure of attack due to addition of points when the attack could
be successful
Figure 21 shows the results of sample 2 that was selected as the best candidate to
execute the attack. While the there is clear evidence that the additional malicious elements
and the payload were not enough to drive the centroid to activate the attack during training,
the same did not occur in the test scenario and could lead to overestimation of the number
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of additional malicious points to add during an attack. This overestimation may lead to
higher degree of detection.
This section has covered some of the important elements of assessment in the execution
of the K-means compromise carried out by an adversary. The following section will cover
the results and interpretation of the test runs carried out for the Kohonen Neural Network
compromise.
Experimental Results for Kohonen Neural Network Compromise
The Kohonen Neural Network implementation poses several constraints for the at-
tacker in terms of fixed parameters which may make or break the viability of the attack,
such as the size of the Kohonen layer and the data set size, among others. This section
explores the Kohonen network in terms of a fixed Kohonen layer of 50 by 50 neurons, with a
fixed constraint of 2,000 epochs and a learning rate of 0.005. The selection of the particular
parameters were chosen to represent a small type of experimental setup which would be
carried out during exploratory analysis of a data set before putting it into production. This
type of scenario would be less susceptible to formal code verification. The parameter con-
straints given are usually fixed by the person running the experiments and would fall outside
of the attackers’ control. This would leave the attacker with the selection of additional data
samples to inject into the application as the only free parameter in an effort to try to shift
the training in favor of the payload execution. The size of the experiment will be limited to
700 randomly chosen samples from the selected data sets. From these, it is assumed that the
attacker has intercepted 200 samples from the data set which are excluded from the testing
set.
The three simulations made by the attacker were structured using three different
positions for the payload within the benign data set. The locations were randomly selected
to simulate various possible conditions under which the attack may be carried out. Under
real training conditions, the attacker would select the position which reflects a distinct
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advantage during a compromise to maximize his possibilities of success.
The results of the tests carried out for the Kohonen network compromise documented
in Appendix B are shown in Figure 22. As with the K-means algorithm, these results
reflect the intrinsic error and are not based on the decoder resolution. The results show
the outcome of the integer value discrimination in the decoder algorithm 7. An interesting
result is that zero error was not achieved in any of the runs using the default evaluation
criteria for the Kohonen algorithm. Notwithstanding, the payload was decoded successfully
in every instance using four decimal places in the extract value function of the decoder
sequence of the algorithm. The selection of the decoding resolution will vary depending
on the additional amount of code that can be inserted into the compromised program, to
dictate the final metric to be used in actual compromises.
Figure 22. Summary of confusion matrix results for the Kohonen compromise
Figure 23 shows that there is no clear trend line between the training versus testing
DS, while the Pearson coefficient shows a weak correlation at .55. The lack of a trend line is
also indicative that there is no clear indication of relationship between the training DS and
testing DS.
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Figure 23. Plot of training vs testing DS of the Kohonen compromise
The training of the Kohonen network’s DS and DCD readings are shown in Figure 24.
The output shows that while the the empty upper right quadrant is smaller than K-means
algorithm, it still follows the intuition of the proposed formulas. Some of the possible reasons
for this deviation may be attributed to the particulars of the encoding and specific data sets
chosen, in addition to the Kohonen’s lateral feedback. While the K-means algorithm treats
each cluster independently, the Kohonen network’s lateral feedback influences nodes that
are in the vicinity of each other.
Figure 24. DCD and DS plot of the three data sets for the Kohonen compromise training. Size of
symbols represent additional malicious elements added to move the clusters
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This phenomena may initially pull neighboring nodes closer to each other, and in some
particular cases, may contribute to additional convergence error and therefore a shift in the
DS towards centered DCD values.
In addition to the difficulty of convergence, the addition of malicious payload to achieve
convergence needs to be considered during training. The figure also shows the results of the
DCD and the DS, while additional payload elements are represented by the sizes of the
icons. The impact of the error minimization of additional malicious payload data points can
also be seen in the epochs as the neural network is trained.
This impact can be seen in Table 29 of the Appendix B, where sample 1 is shown with
an additional payload sequence. This means that to achieve zero error, the attacker had to
reinsert the 112 vector sequence once more to achieve the desired result. In summary, for
that particular sample, the training entails: 140 intercepted vectors, 112 samples inserted
twice, and 505 randomly generated samples, for total 869 samples of training data. The
figure 25 shows the training set, with the top line being the single insertion of the payload,
and the bottom one is the payload that was inserted twice, that achieves zero error
Figure 25. Comparison of insertion of additional payload sequence and single insertion of payload
sequence
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Additional Results for Kohonen Neural Network with Different Kohonen Layer Sizes
The Kohonen experiments were done with a 50*50 fixed layer size. An important
question to answer is what effect on the payload execution does to the variation of the
Kohonen layer size have when the end user that utilizes the compromised algorithm. The
data set used for this test was the KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline
using win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator payload. 22 offsets were
selected for the order column offset, and 31 for the payload column offset. The epochs and
the learning rate used were the same as those for the rest of the Kohonen experiments.
The results obtained for the different Kohonen layer sizes are shown in Table 4. As can
be seen from the table results, the same caution as with the K-means algorithm needs to
be taken with the Kohonen algorithm’s DS reading. While the DS reading can be a good
confusion matrix summary, it does not necessarily reflect the type of error that the algorithm
is obtaining due to the data. The table shows that while the Kohonen layer size grows, so
does the DS value. While this may not be indicative of a definitive trend, it does highlight
a possible point to consider on the part of the adversary when deploying the attack.
Size DS Error in Payload
50*50 1.0600 2
40*40 0.6712 7
30*30 0.4149 57
20*20 0.1494 94
Table 4: Results of varying Kohonen layer sizes using the KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data
Set Baseline and win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator payload
Experimental Results for Kohonen Neural Network U-Matrix Attack Variant
The Kohonen Neural Network U-Matrix compromise merits a separate discussion from
the previous Kohonen compromise. While the compromised algorithm is the same, the
characteristics of the encoding do change and merit closer inspection, since they will impact
the results obtained. As discussed in the previous chapter, the encoding of the U-Matrix
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compromise is an actual embedding of a submatrix within the matrix that comprises the
Kohonen layer. A common observed characteristic shared by all the payloads encoded was
that there was a substantial spread in the magnitude of the numbers embedded as part of
the compromise. This phenomenon can be seen in Figure 26. This will have an influence in
the Kohonen algorithm with its convergence results, especially with lateral feedback.
Figure 26. win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with its Corresponding U-Matrix
Encoding
The results of the tests carried out for this compromise in Appendix C are summarized
in Figure 27. As can be seen in the comparison between both the Kohonen and the Kohonen
U-Matrix compromise, the results vary substantially in composition. The biggest error in the
Kohonen U-Matrix compromise is the benign data considered as payload in the test carried
out, by adding additional benign samples to the data set. This contrasts with the Kohonen’s
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previous compromise, in which the biggest error was in the baseline, and consisted in both
types of error, benign as payload and payload as benign.
Figure 27. Summary of confusion matrix results for the Kohonen algorithm U-Matrix compromise
To further investigate the results obtained, a correlation analysis was made, as with
the previous algorithms. A weak correlation of 0.59 was obtained. The plot of the training
vs testing DS is shown in Figure 28, where it can be seen that there is a slight trend, but it
is not of a linear nature.
Figure 28. Plot of training vs testing DS of Kohonen U-Matrix compromise
The plot of the DCD versus DS sustains the results observed with the previous algo-
rithms, in that as DCD becomes higher, there should be a lower DS.
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Figure 29. DCD and DS plot of the three data sets for the Kohonen U-Matrix compromise training.
Size of symbols represent additional malicious elements added to move the clusters
An additional consideration to take into account for this compromise is the padding
for the compromise. As discussed in the previous chapter, the U-Matrix compromise needs
a padding at the lower part of the matrix to be feasible. It was found that on Table 44, in
the confusion matrix, payload misclassified as benign was composed of the padding points,
and not on the payload attack points themselves. This points to caution on the part of the
adversary, since the selection of the padding values may also be critical in establishing zero
error.
Experimental Results for Adaptive Resonance Algorithm
The Adaptive Resonance 1 Algorithm uses binary input; and outputs a cluster assign-
ment based on a cluster prototype. In this work, all computations were made by converting
the binary values back to decimal to maintain uniformity in the measurements with regards
to other algorithms. To carry out the tests described in the previous chapter for Adaptive
Resonance 1, all inputs from the data sets that were not of integer value were converted by
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rounding to the closest integer, using a fixed learning rate of 2.0. All attacks were carried
out by using zero values in the rest of the vector that comprises the payload. The selection of
the zero value as the padding for the Adaptive Resonance was due to the way the algorithm
classifies the data. The vigilance parameter determines the granularity of the clusters based
on the differences between binary vectors. If the vectors were filled with random values,
their binary equivalent would add too much noise to the data processed by the algorithm.
The drawback of this technique is that while it increases the probability of successful attack,
it can also lead to easier detection.
The test results of Appendix D are shown in Figure 30.The results show that, as
opposed to other algorithms, the Adaptive Resonance response to payload injection is very
favorable due to its high success rate. Nonetheless, the encoding conversion to binary values
may be enough to arise suspicion since binary vectors will appear unreasonable large if done
on a data set with small values.
Figure 30. Summary of confusion matrix results for the Adaptive Resonance algorithm compromise
Figure 31 demonstrates a graph of the vigilance parameters used in the test results
displayed in order of increasing value. The figure demonstrates that zero error is achieved
while the vigilance parameter falls below a given vigilance value.
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Figure 31. Sorted vigilance parameter on the x-axis with its corresponding DS value result for the
test runs
While the algorithm displays several favorable qualities, such as encoding simplicity
and a high degree of success versus other algorithms, it has some drawbacks in terms of
analyzing the training of the algorithm. Being binary valued in nature, the algorithm’s
success was hard limited in terms of being successful or not. The densities remained the
same throughout the training, since the cluster assignment into either malicious or benign
is independent of the number of clusters. Another limitation is that while the DS is a good
indicator of success, it was dependent mainly on the value of the vigilance parameter that
falls outside of the attacker’s control. While there might be perfect execution of the algorithm
under training, it may completely fail if the vigilance parameter varies considerably. This
phenomenon occurred only in a limited number of tests, however it remains a considerable
factor when the adversary is implementing the algorithm.
Another result that was obtained, which might be interpreted as a drawback, is the
example in Table 5, which shows an interesting behavior in the DCD. These results were
derived from Table 64 of Appendix E. The results illustrate that the DCD must be carefully
handled for unsupervised algorithms that do not specify in advance the number of clusters,
since the cluster distance may be warped by the equation’s denominator as the number of
clusters grow.
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Sample 1 with DCD of 0.180
Trojan Payload Benign Data
Cluster 0 1 2 3
Frequency: 51 130 1491 1279
Sample 2 with DCD of 0.210
Trojan Payload Benign Data
Cluster 0 1 2 3 4
Frequency: 24 27 521 1277 1102
Sample 3 with DCD of 0.074
Trojan Payload Benign Data
Cluster 0 1 2
Frequency: 31 20 2900
Table 5: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set Baseline using Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP
calc shellcode
Effects of Varying the Number of Data Columns and the Vigilance Parameter
The results demonstrated for the tests made on the Adaptive Resonance algorithm in
the last section were done using a fixed number of columns and a fixed vigilance parameter
throughout all runs. This section covers the impact of the selection of columns and vig-
ilance parameter in a given data set and the implications for the attacker’s design of the
compromise.
The tests were started by varying the number of columns using a fixed vigilance
parameter of 0.3 and a fixed learning rate 2.0. The tests were carried out on the KEGG
Metabolic Network Data Set by selecting 10,683 random instances from the data set using
OSX/Intel - setuid shell x86_64 payload. The ranges used for the payload and benign data
set tested are shown in Table 6. The addition of columns were also filled with zero vectors
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to limit the amount of influence due to random variations in non payload columns.
Data Set Payload 1 Payload 2
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Column 1 2 116 170 225 257 312
Column 2 1 509 1024 1279 2049 2304
Table 6: Minimum and maximum of data set range of the two columns used along with the Payload
Range
Figure 32 shows the output for payload 2 and benign data. The graph starts by
showing the results of just three columns from the data set and incrementally showing the
addition of more columns from the data set to make a larger feature vector. While there
is a clear trend towards reduction of clusters as the columns from the data set are added,
(showing signs of homogeneity as the addition progresses), a sudden change occurs in column
5, indicating that the pattern of homogenization depends on the column values. In this case,
column 5 of the data set has a significantly smaller range than the rest of the first eight
columns sampled.
Figure 32. Log plot showing results of data set column additions for payload 3 of Table 6
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Table 7 shows the average values of DYTrojan DS and DCD for the clusters obtained
for each run. As it should be expected, the DS will be decreased as the number of elements
belonging to cluster 1 increases, with the addition of columns making the denominator larger
in magnitude. The density for the malicious cluster remained fixed during the duration of
the addition of the columns.
The reason behind the fixed density is that the elements inside the clusters and the
dimensions of the column grew at a constant ratio, therefore giving the same result. The
DCD value behavior can be explained by observing that the number of cluster decreases
as the number of rows increases. The row increase allows for greater homogeneity on the
ratio of zeros to ones in the encoding, giving way to a consolidation of clusters. This will
mean that the numerator in the DCD computation will decrease in magnitude. While the
distances of the centroids may vary, the decreasing number of clusters is enough to influence
the computation of the DCD towards smaller values.
Payload 2
Columns DS DY_Trojan DCD
2 0.0287 0.0011 2.64
3 0.0230 0.0011 2.34
4 0.0245 0.0011 2.33
5 0.0113 0.0011 1.55
6 0.0142 0.0011 1.19
7 0.0120 0.0011 0.92
8 0.0112 0.0011 0.92
Table 7: Impact of column additions on DY_Mal DS and DCD
Figure 33 shows the vigilance parameter effects on the same data set using payload
1. The results show how the clustering arrangement for the payload and how the malicious
payload achieves total exclusion of the benign sets as the vigilance parameter is lowered.
The lowering of the vigilance parameter makes the cluster threshold bound tighter, and
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therefore creates a more crisp segregation between the payload and the benign data.
Figure 33. Log plot of vigilance parameter behavior
For the payload 1, the total segregation happened at the vigilance parameter of 0.13,
while the payload 2 segregation occurred at 0.16. This places a constraint on the attacker,
since the vigilance parameter has to be estimated in order to carry out a successful attack.
Table 8 shows the results of the DS, DYTrojan, and DCD, as the vigilance parameter
is increased in payload 1. Zero error was achieved in this instance at a value between the
0.13 and 0.14. This is the same response as payload 2 but with a different threshold value
for the vigilance parameter, and zero error in classifying the payload from the benign data.
Payload 1
Vigilance Parameter DS DY_Trojan DCD
0.13 0.0000 0.0038 3.02
0.14 0.0727 0.0036 2.74
0.30 1.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.90 1.0000 0.0000 0.00
Table 8: Parameters DY, DS, and DCD for the vigilance parameter variation
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Significance Tests on the Use of a Particular Algorithm Attack on Shared Data Set
The use of the same data set on different machine learning algorithms lead to the
question on whether compromising a particular algorithm and using a particular data set
is more advantageous. To carry out this analysis, the Friedman nonparametric test was
utilized. The results analyzed were based on the error obtained during the test executed,
and were normalized using the total number of samples in the test run. The algorithm that
obtained the least normalized error was chosen to be the biggest score.
The selected data set, which overlaps all algorithms, is the KEGG Metabolic Network
Data Set Using Baseline and the additional benign data point addition tests. For this data
set, the number of tests carried out on simple Kohonen and Kohonen U-Matrix compromises
were less than those for the K-means and Adaptive Resonance compromises. To resolve this
difference, two more tests were added to both Appendix B and C to match the number of
samples for the KEGG Metabolic Network Data Set to three runs baseline and three runs
with additional benign data sets. This allows to approximate the Friedman rank test F
to the χ2 distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom (Stamatis, 2002). The formula for this
statistic is:
F =
12
Nk(k + 1)
[∑
R2i
]
− 3N(k + 1) (39)
For the Friedman test, it was assumed that:
H0: There is no difference among learning algorithms used to insert the payload.
Ha: There is a difference among learning algorithms used to insert the payload.
The scoring for the Friedman test is presented in Table 9.
The result for the Equation 39 was:
F =
12
6 ∗ 4 (4 + 1)
(
18.52 + 102 + 92 + 22.52
)− 3 ∗ 6 (4 + 1) = 11.125 (40)
The value of χ2.005 = 12.838, thus the result is that 11.125 ≯ 12.838, giving way to a
rejection of the alternate hypothesis and accepting that the null hypothesis is correct.
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K-means Kohonen Kohonen U-Matrix Adaptive Resonance
2.000 3.000 1.0 4.00
3.000 1.000 2.0 4.00
3.500 1.000 2.0 3.50
3.500 2.000 1.0 3.50
3.500 2.000 1.0 3.50
3.000 1.000 2.0 4.00 Column Sum
Sums 18.500 10.000 9.0 22.50 40
Observed Means 3.083 1.667 1.5 3.75 10
Null Hypothesis 2.500 2.500 2.5 2.50 10
Sample Count 6.000 6.000 6.0 6.00 24
Table 9: Results of Friedman test scoring for the KEGG Metabolic Network data set with baseline
and additional data points
The graph of the mean rank of the expected null hypothesis versus the obtained mean
ranks appears in Figure 34:
Figure 34. Friedman values for the mean rank of Expected Null Hypothesis vs observed
Significance Tests of Baseline Versus Additional Samples in Data Set
An important part of the experimental design presented throughout this dissertation
is the tests between a baseline of intercepted messages and the addition of generated benign
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Baseline Additional Signed Rank
89 100 5
97 100 3
100 97 -3
62 100 6
59 60 1
100 100 0
97 100 3
100 100 0
100 11 -7
Figure 35. Results of Wilcoxon signed ranked test for the K-means compromise
samples. The addition of samples is intended to simulate the rest of the data that was not
intercepted by the attacker, in an effort to make the training more realistic with regards
to the eventual size of the analyzed data. To achieve this comparison, all test results were
normalized using the error over the total number of samples. This result was then subtracted
from one to obtain a normalized score.
To answer the question whether the tests with added samples are effective, a Wilcoxon
significance test was carried out for each of the algorithms tested. For the test, it is assumed
that:
H0: The distribution of baseline intercepted samples and additional benign samples
is the same.
Ha: The distribution of the additional generated samples varies substantially from
the baseline.
For the K-means algorithm, the signed ranked score is given in Table 35.
The rank-sum test statistic W for the K-means sample is 10, with the number of
samples n = 7. The critical W for 5% level is 2. Therefore, the results demonstrate that
the null hypothesis must be accepted, since W >= critical W.
The Kohonen compromise test results are given in Table 36
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Baseline Additional Signed Rank
96 97 1.5
84 92 5
93 95 3.5
93 94 1.5
97 97 0
94 92 -3.5
Figure 36. Results of Wilcoxon signed ranked test for the Kohonen compromise
Baseline Additional Signed Rank
85 86 1
90 83 -4
86 95 5
94 90 -3
87 85 -2
89 89 0
Figure 37. Results of Wilcoxon signed ranked test for the Kohonen U-Matrix compromise
In this case, the obtained W value was 3.5. The critical value of W for N = 5 at p
≤ 0.05 is 0. Therefore, the result is not significant at p ≤ 0.05. Under this result, the null
hypothesis must also be accepted for the Kohonen test results.
Finally, the results for the Kohonen U-Matrix test results are given in Table 37, where
W = 6, and the critical value of W for N = 5 at p ≤ 0.05 is 0. Therefore, the result is not
significant at p ≤ 0.05.
Adaptive Resonance was not included, since the errors obtained in the tests were
less than 0.5, giving zero difference throughout all samples, when rounded to a percentage
number without decimal positions in all the Wilcoxon Signed Rank results.
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Performance Analysis of the Compromises
The results presented where based on an evaluation that included two factors that
decreased the accuracy results. The first factor is that the criteria contemplated both the
stealth and the accuracy of the compromise. Both of these goals an be visualized as opposing
objectives in a gradient as shown in Figure 38. The second factor was the random selection
of the measurements that added to the decrease in accuracy of the results obtained.
Figure 38. Compromise vs. stealth gradient
It can be argumented that whenever the adversary chooses this tradeoff of stealth
versus accuracy the attack results will be mixed as those obtained in the experiments carried
out in this dissertation. In the next paragraphs a brief explanation using K-means, the Self
Organizing Feature Map, and Adaptive Resonance algorithms will be given as examples of
why this tradeoff is intrinsic of the nature of the attack. Empirical tests of the analysis is
proposed as future work.
The K-means algorithm was presented in chapter three and it described the steps
carried out by the algorithm. In the algorithm execution, the second step is to assign the
sample points according to the distance metric comparison of: |x− µj | < |x− µk|. Distance
measures for segregation assume that if the clusters are separated by enough distance then
discrimination into the correct cluster can be done. This is the first assumption that must
be sacrificed under a K-means attack (and under any distance measurement unsupervised
algorithm) if stealth is desired. For the attacker to be effective in providing stealth the
payload must be close to the real data as possible. If this is not done, the payload may
appear as unreasonable outliers that can alert the end user that the data is wrong, and
may lead to suspicion of an attack taking place. Under the tests carried out, the locations
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were randomly chosen which violated optimal placement that increases the accuracy of the
results but gave reasonable stealth to the attack.
The second point to consider in the tradeoff is the result of step 3 of the algorithm
that calculates the new centroids by using the update rule: µk = 1NkΣ
Nk
q=1xq. The update
rule is sensitive to two specific issues. The first is the presence of an outlier within the
elements contemplated within the assigned cluster. The second is the number of elements
that are part of the assigned cluster. Both of this issues can be controlled by the adversary
to the desired degree of accuracy. By fulfilling the distance criteria (given by the distance
measure of step 2 of the algorithm) the attacker can then choose the appropriate encoding
to minimize the possibility of an outlier being present in the dataset. This will guarantee
that the numerator will be roughly homogeneous within the update rule and will not bias
the mean measurement of the centroid. The second issue is the number of elements that are
assigned to the cluster that, if the attacker fulfills the distance criteria, then he can inject
additional instances of the attack or closely spaced points to bias the centroid even more
towards the attack surface.
For the Self Organizing Feature Map The distance is calculated using: Distancej =∑n
i=1 (Inputi −Wold ij) which offers the same tradeoff for the adversary. Nonetheless, there
are three major differences in carrying out the SOFM compromise that need to be care-
fully analyzed. The first one is that individual payload elements are assigned to individual
neurons as opposed to clusters in K-means. Individual assignment of payload elements will
depend on whether a node can be assigned on a one to one correspondence to the pay-
load value. This has to be forecasted by the adversary using as guide the results obtained
in the experimental section on different Kohonen layer sizes. As the Kohonen layer sizes
decrease an additional number of payload copies have to be injected by the adversary to
close the distance within epoch calculations and decrease stealthiness. Notwithstanding, the
distance can be arbitrarily small by the attacker by injecting enough payload copies given a
reasonable size Kohonen layer which can support the mixture of payload and benign data.
The second difference lies in the lateral feedback impact on payload elements with
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benign neighbors. The impact of the lateral feedback imposes another hurdle that can be
remedied by increasing the number of payload copies into the algorithm to compensate for
the lateral feedback “pull” from neighbors on payload nodes. Additional copies of the nodes
have to be injected by the adversary to negate the effects of the pull of the neighbors on the
final payload value with the same result of reducing the stealth of the attack.
The final difference lies in the weight adjustment by the learning coefficient c and the
neighborhood function η of equation 23. These two parameters will impact the within epoch
learning rate and convergence of the neural network to the desired values. The setting of
these values will definitely determine the convergence of the nodes upon the payload values
and this must be compensated by the adversary by additional copies to be calculated during
a particular epoch of the algorithm. This third parameter will also increase the number of
copies if the parameters are to low and make the learning steps slow in convergence.
The Adaptive Resonance Algorithm works in a winner take all fashion in which the
closeness to the clusters is already formed by the algorithm. The closeness measure is given
by equation 37 which is governed by the vigilance parameter. If the left hand side of the
equation falls below the established vigilance parameter it rejects the cluster assignment
until all clusters are compared and a new cluster is formed. The success of the compromise
depends mostly on the previous consideration which takes into account the following two
elements. The payload values should be close enough in value such that the conversion to
binary values should remain below the vigilance parameter. This implies careful selection
of the exploit to cluster the values close enough within a single cluster. The second element
to consider is that the separation of binary differences between the payload and the benign
data set are enough so that benign data fails the vigilance test and fall in a cluster that is
not part of the payload. These criteria set the theoretical limitations of the attack for the
adaptive resonance and can be met by an attacker under reasonable assumptions.
The discussion above does not include additonal compromise elements that the at-
tacker can carry out to guarantee the attacks success. Since the Trojan also contains a
software compromise the attacker can also fix some of the parameters during the learning of
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the exploit. The attacker can also carry out denial of service on the benign data elements to
skew the learning towards favorable compromise outcomes, among other possibilities. While
these attacks can greatly improve the outcome of the adversary, it also alerts the user of the
adversary’s acitvities and therefore lower the stealth of the attacks. These techniques were
not contemplated as part of the work, since they are not part of the learning compromise
but can skew the results on the part of the adversary more than show the effects of the
compromise on the learning algorithm’s results.
Under the experiments carried the optimal convergence criteria were not pursued
directly to obtain high degree of accuracy, since this would completely bias the experimental
results for the test of hypothesis. Instead it was chosen to represent scenarios were the
attacker was forced to contemplate the tradeoff of accuracy to present a broader scenario
and provide random results that presents the middle bounds of accuracy versus stealth. In
addition, further knowledge of the data domain was not considered in the modeled attacks
which can further increase the chances of success and stealth of the adversary.
Summary
This section has presented the tests carried out on the unsupervised learning Trojan
compromise. The section implemented the procedures introduced in Chapter 3 that con-
templated three algorithms, eight exploits and four data sets. The data sets and exploits
were divided so that each of the algorithms contained at least one data set in common with
all others.
The chapter also presented individual analysis of each of tests and training runs for
each of the algorithms. Several highlights were made in this chapter, especially with the
relationship between the DS and the DCD. The chapter also emphasized caution on incor-
rectly interpreting the DS value, since it is a summary of the error and does not provide
exact information on the specific type of error encountered during the tests.
Two hypotheses tests were carried out in this chapter. The first hypothesis test per-
tained to the performance of the compromises on the algorithms tested. Using the Friedman
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nonparametric test, it was found that there was no statistical significance in in terms of per-
formance, among the encoding tested on the three unsupervised learning algorithms.
The second significance test involved evaluating the difference between a baseline of
intercepted data samples versus an intercepted data sample with additional benign vectors
generated based on a Gaussian distribution assumption. To answer this hypothesis, the
Wilcoxon signed rank test was utilized. It was found that in each of the algorithms the null
hypothesis had to be accepted, since the difference was not statistically significant.
The chapter also discussed the performance analysis of the compromised algorithms
where a discussion of the results presented arguments to show that performance of the
algorithms can in principle achieve high degree of accuracy if stealth is neglected. Under the
arguments presented, it should be reasonable to assume that the attacks can be optimized
by an adversary with enough accuracy can be successfully employed in real world scenarios.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
In this research, the design of the unsupervised learning Trojan methodology was
presented to highlight the importance of Trojans within the field of machine learning. This
work extended the work of the Neural Network Trojan and it is part of a hypothesis that
all machine learning algorithms are susceptible to Trojans.
The main problem to solve within the unsupervised learning compromise is the un-
supervised learning Trojan density problem and a subproblem of the cluster identification.
The unsupervised learning density problem is the general question of whether under general
conditions the malicious cluster can be identified by an unsupervised learning algorithm.
It was shown that this type of problem is basically a density estimation problem, and in
principle, can be generally be solved.
The subproblem of cluster identification was analyzed to obtain general guidelines on
the particular characteristics of the data that can be leveraged to solve the cluster identifi-
cation subproblem. The challenge in finding a solution to the cluster identification problem
is that the unsupervised learning algorithms are designed to separate clusters and not nec-
essarily discriminate them. From there, an analysis was presented on intrinsic and extrinsic
attributes of the payload that can be leveraged to discriminate malicious from benign data.
Intrinsic properties were defined as those within a single cluster, while the extrinsic proper-
ties are those that can differentiate a malicious clusters from other benign clusters.
To show the effectiveness of the analysis, four compromises were designed to be carried
out on three learning algorithms. Two of the compromises were designed for the Kohonen
algorithm, another was designed for the K-means algorithm, and the final one was directed
towards Adaptive Resonance. All four compromises were tested on the three algorithms
under random testing, and with an emphasis on evaluating only the impact of the payload
on the algorithms behavior with a less discriminative decoder, the results were moderate in
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success.
Under the analysis presented, it was shown that if the payload displayed extreme val-
ues such as those of the Kohonen U-Matrix encoding and big payloads under the Adaptive
Resonance compromise, the attacks could be susceptible to discovery without much inspec-
tion. This presents a limitation in those types of attacks that are efficient, but provide less
stealth capability for the attack. With the K-means compromise, the radius and shape of
the compromise can lead to detection, but this detection would take place upon execution
of a visualization technique.
The drawbacks of the particular encoding also lead to possible improvements to avoid
detection. These rely on diminishing the surface area of the attack. In other words, the
payloads can be selected and encoded with minimal impact on the characteristics of the
data set. For example, in Adaptive Resonance, the distance from the payload can be tested
to see what is the minimal distance that can lead to a minimal impact on the size of the
binary encoding. With respect to K-means, the radius of the hull can be chosen to be less
conspicuous.
The detection problem leads to another element of evaluation, which is the decoder
of the payload. This requires access to modify the algorithm’s implementation. Four modi-
fications were presented to demonstrate the changes required to carry out the compromises
documented in this research. The decoders explored do provide for particular implementa-
tions that can take into account the accuracy required to carry out the particular type of
attack.
The research also presented a procedure that the adversary could use to evaluate the
effectiveness of the compromises on the given data sets. The procedure consisted on analyz-
ing an obtained sample from the expected data set to be analyzed, and use it as a training
set on which to test the payload configurations. The procedure utilized a random selection
of parameters to demonstrate a variety of possible scenarios which might be encountered
during the execution of the procedure. Two particular aspects of the procedure were evalu-
ated for statistical significance: the use of a particular algorithm attack on a data set and
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the use of a baseline versus a sample with added data points to simulate a larger dataset.
For this evaluation, the null hypothesis presented was that none of the four particular
encodings on the three data sets had a particular advantage, while the alternate hypothesis
sustained that the encoding did make a difference. Under the Friedman non parametric
test, it was found that none of the attacks had a particular advantage over the other in
obtaining better results. This does not necessarily mean that for an adversary this will be
the case, as under most scenarios, the adversary will select the compromise algorithm which
provides the best attack surface. It will also depend on the particular preference and ease
of deployment that a particular compromise may have on a given scenario.
The second test carried out was the use of a baseline of only the intercepted sample
for training, versus a training that included the intercepted data plus an additional number
of samples added based on a Gaussian distribution. Each of the compromises was tested
independently using the Wilcoxon ranked test and found no significant difference between
them. Doing a non statistical analysis of the results of the K-means algorithm provided an
example of a situation addition of samples can lead to an overestimation of the complexity
of the capacities needed to drive the centroids towards the payload for activation. This effect
may lead the adversary into injecting additional malicious data vectors to bias the results.
In principle, this could lead to a better overall success rate, but also to a higher detection
rate.
While the two tests carried out led to acceptance of the null hypothesis and that the
results showed mixed success rates in the compromises, there are several elements to take
into consideration when interpreting the results. The experimental setup presented in this
chapter had as a goal to demonstrate a random selection of parameters to introduce the new
types of attacks. The random nature of the setup is designed to show average performance
behavior and does not necessarily show optimal conditions that an attacker may carry out.
It was also documented that under reasonable configurations of the decoder, the attacks
were substantially more successful than the bound imposed in the tests results presented.
While the assumptions for the experiment followed Kerckhoffs’s principle, the experimental
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setup itself assumed random scenarios which lead to substantial underperformance of the
compromises. These factors imply that careful interpretation of the results are needed to
assess the real implications of these attacks under real life scenarios.
Implications
In this work, the unsupervised learning Trojan was presented which aimed at demon-
strating a proof of concept of how malware directed towards this kind of learning can be
achieved. The implications of this compromise can be seen from a security perspective and
from a more general perspective on machine learning.
From the security perspective, it is the first time that a malware is designed to take
advantage of this type of learning. While there existed several compromises in adversarial
machine learning, their aim was to subvert the learning process and not to take advantage
of the algorithm to introduce a payload into a system as the ULT does.
While the research focused on showing how the compromise is achieved, its ultimate
objective is to bring to light the capability that an adversary could possess, before it can
actually happen in a real world scenario. This opens the possibility of research in areas
such as malware detection and prevention, in order to study compromise work detection
techniques that can be designed to prevent possible attacks.
The execution of the ULT under this work also gives further positive indications on
the hypothesis that in principle, all machine learning algorithms are susceptible to malware
compromises. The repercussions of these findings support the need for further research in
other types of machine learning algorithms that may be either unsupervised, supervised, or
reinforcement learning.
The work presented, along with the neural network Trojan, has further implications
that go beyond the security aspects of machine learning. Learning entails not just the
generalization capability, but also the capability to memorize. The insertion of the payloads
which the algorithm needs to be precisely recalled, as well as having a data set which needs
to be generalized, provides an example of both types of capabilities.
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Recommendations and Future Work
The field of adversarial machine learning is a very important one within the general
field of machine learning. As machine learning continues to gain prominence outside of the
academic field and into production environments, more security concerns will arise. This
need is not just based on finding out what are the possible compromises, but also on ways
to detect and prevent them.
The work presented in this dissertation was delimited to a proof of concept of the un-
supervised learning Trojan. This initial effort opens the door to substantial further research
in the area of malware for machine learning algorithm. These areas of future research can
be divided into:
1. Exploring different constraints on the access available to the attacker.
2. Refining the methodology presented.
3. Finding detection techniques for such compromises.
Each of these will be briefly discussed below.
The work presented assumed that the source code was readily available for compro-
mise. Under certain circumstances, this may not be possible or practical for the adversary.
Future work may concentrate on different methods in which the attacker could gain access
to the learning algorithm, including compiled executables. Another area that merits further
research is the execution of the algorithm in embedded hardware platforms and specialized
circuits. Future research could include how to compromise such hardware devices without
necessarily obtaining schematics or additional information on the platform.
Other constrains that merit further research are the assumptions that the attacker
cannot leverage information about the data set. Research in this area may focus on how
to take advantage of additional information such as sample statistics of individual fields
to maximize the attack probability. It can also focus on real constraints, such as avoiding
detection by adjusting the values to reasonable thresholds that the data may have within
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a specific data set. These constraints can also be tested under the assumption that the
attacker needs minimal stealth and test the analytical assumptions proposed at the end of
the previous chapter.
An assumption that was maintained throughout the procedure was the Gaussian dis-
tribution assumption on which to generate the additional benign samples. This does not
necessarily reflect the distribution of the targeted data set. Future work can focus on how to
analyze small samples to calculate the moments of the samples and obtain a better expanded
training set on which to test the payloads.
Additional refinements to the methodology also include a more realistic assessment
of the misclassified samples during the training and testing session. The addition of a loss
function in future work may assign different weights to the benign data classified as malicious
samples that are different to the weights assigned to malicious samples classified as benign.
This will provide a better assessment of the results obtained in the confusion matrix results.
The work needs to be extended on the number of samples used for the statistical
measurements to further corroborate the results presented here, along with additional un-
supervised algorithms. This will support the results already obtained and expand the work
on further techniques that leverage the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the clusters. Ad-
ditional work also needs to be carried on density estimation based on the obtained sample
so that inclusion of the bening density measurement can provide useful measurment of the
test density
The work focused on presenting the proof of concept and did not go into the critical
part of detection and prevention of the attack. Two immediate mitigation techniques that
can be implemented are: Improvements in code validation of machine learning software and
outlier detection. Improvements to current code validation techniques require segregation
of duties between the programmers who build the code for the machine learning algorithm
and those that put together and run the dataset on the machine learning algorithm. Im-
proved code walk through validation techniques taking into account possible compromises
on machine learning algorithms will help mitigate any possible malicious code insertions.
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Additional work on detection techniques can focus on outlier detection. The outlier
detection may focus on leveraging the tradeoff between stealth and accuracy. As the attacker
chooses a strategy of accuracy and neglects stealth, the attack data can be target to outlier
detection. The outlier detection code can be done by an independent party and provide
additional segregation of duties in the execution of the code that is used in machine learning.
Further work in this area that may be considered future work is to leverage the intrinsic
and extrinsic properties of utilized in the compromise to try to develop signatures for the
attack. The challenge in this area is that the variability of the parameters of the intrinsic and
extrinsic properties exploited by the compromises can be hard to normalize into a signature
based system. Another technique that might be pursued is the use of different algorithms
to pretest the data to determine whether there is a compromise in the data. This would
lead to new analysis techniques on which to detect discriminating patterns, and not just
identification of clusters in the data.
Summary
The Unsupervised learning Trojan is a malware insertion technique that leverages the
unsupervised algorithms to carry out the activation and encoding of a malicious payload.
The attack leverages either intrinsic or extrinsic properties, such as size of the sampled data,
location, uniformity or density, among other possible properties to encode and activate the
attack.
The unsupervised learning Trojan is a continuation on the work started on the Neural
Network Trojan. Under the supervised learning of the neural network Trojan the attacker
had complete control of the properties of the malware. Under the Unsupervised Learning
Trojan, the adversary does not have access to a training set on which to encode the values
that will be embedded on the matrix of weights as in the Neural Network Trojan. Instead,
the learning Trojan poses a challenge of the Unsupervised Learning Trojan density problem.
The main problem is to find a way on which the algorithm can, without any prior training,
isolate the payload that is inserted as part of a benign data set into a distinct group.
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Mathematically, this is equivalent to density estimation of the distributions of the targeted
data set under unsupervised learning.
A sub problem within the density estimation is the malicious cluster identification.
By leveraging the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the payload, the attacker can then
discriminate the malicious points within the data set’s underlying distribution. The prop-
erties can also be leveraged to provide a mechanism to activate the payload upon certain
threshold or embedded requirement that is integrated into the design of the unsupervised
learning malware.
To analyze the Unsupervised Learning Trojan Density problem and the cluster iden-
tification subproblem, several formulas are proposed as part of generalized procedure. The
procedure consists of converting an unsupervised learning execution into a “training” or cal-
ibration phase where the attacker measures the effectiveness of an attack. This training
phase is based on the assumption that the adversary has intercepted part of the data that
will be used by the compromised code of the algorithm, and it serves to obtain estimates of
the underlying distribution of the data that will be subjected to payload insertion.
The outlined training procedure also provides a scoring example based on a compro-
mise between execution and stealthiness. This scoring procedure can be changed by an
adversary to allow for the particulars of a specific compromise. The scoring’s intended goal
is to choose the particular training instance that matches the attacker’s main goal, whether
it is malware execution guarantee or stealthiness. For example, execution guarantee may
incur in additional malicious samples being injected into the data steam, therefore making
the compromise more susceptible to detection.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the procedure, four example compromises were
devised on three algorithms. The algorithms chosen for the compromise were K-means,
Kohonen, and Adaptive Resonance 1. Each of these algorithms had particular differences
that made each of the compromises particular in nature.
For the K-means algorithm, the compromise consisted on encoding the payload as
a hull, which provided the boundary of the malicious cluster. The objective was to put
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enough additional malicious samples within the hull, so that one of the centroids fell within
the confines of the hull. The centroids’ action of falling into the hull would then activate
the decoder sequence to read the values of the points that comprised the hull and decode
them into their final hexadecimal values.
The second and third compromises were directed at the Kohonen algorithm. The
first Kohonen compromise consisted on embedding the decimal equivalent of the payload
hexadecimal values into one of the set of weights of the algorithm. The sequence was then
inserted into a second set of weights which provided the execution order for the payload.
Finally, the compromise allowed the weights of the Kohonen algorithms to converge on these
values. Once the algorithm finishes its epoch runs, the decoder is run on the particular
sequence. A starting value of the sequence and payload must be given to the decoder so
that the decoder can successfully read the compromise.
The second Kohonen compromise is directed at the visualization of the algorithm’s
output as a U-Matrix. The visualization technique compromise embeds the values of the
payload into a submatrix of the Kohonen layer. When the U-Matrix visualization functions
are called, the values of the Kohonen layer are processed by the U-Matrix formula which
will then also decode the payload submatrix. The decoder of this compromise just needs
the position of the submatrix within the Kohonen layer to read the payloads contents.
The final compromise is directed towards the Adaptive Resonance algorithm, and
consisted on a similar encoding technique as the first Kohonen compromise. Two columns
from the data set were identified as the targets of insertion for the payload and the sequence,
respectively. The decimal values of the payload, the sequence, and the rest of the data set
were then converted to binary values for processing by the Adaptive Resonance algorithm.
The four compromises were tested on a total of four data sets and eight selected
payloads. For the K-means compromise, a total of 18 procedures were carried out, consisting
of three training runs and one testing run. The runs used three of the four data sets and
three of the selected compromises. The Kohonen compromise procedure was repeated 12
times for each compromise, using three data sets and two payloads. Finally, for Adaptive
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Resonance, 12 procedures were carried out with two data sets and two payloads.
The tests carried out were configured to demonstrate a random selection of parameters
to introduce the new types of attacks. This implies that some of the runs exhibited less than
optimal outcomes, while other showed superior performance, which may not be indicative of
possible results under real life conditions. Under real life conditions, the attacker may choose
the optimal outcome based on the information that is available to him. Notwithstanding,
the procedures showed a variety of outcomes that represent a wide range of scenarios, which
was the main objective of the study.
Additional considerations of the outcomes of the study pertain to the chosen resolution
of the decoder. The reported outcomes of the study were made with the minimum resolution
of a decoder, which in most instances was suboptimal. Under the optimal configuration of the
decoder, the attacks obtained substantial success rate above the reported results documented
in this study. This was also part of the aims of the study, which is to provide a lower bound
on the success rate of the attack.
A specific goal of the study was to test two particular hypothesis of the described
procedures. The first one was to test whether the use of a particular algorithm attack on
shared data set was significant. For this test, a common data set was selected among all the
compromises and a Friedman significance test was implemented. It was determined under
the test that there was no significant difference among the compromise chosen in terms of
its performance over the others.
The second test was to determine whether there was a particular advantage of utilizing
additional generated samples to simulate the final environment on which the malware will
execute. The generation of additional vectors assumed a Gaussian distribution to generate
the additional data elements for the simulation. It was determined, using the Wilcoxon
ranked test, that there was no advantage over using only the intercepted sample by the
adversary.
It should be highlighted, that while research carried out followed Kerckhoffs’s principle,
the experimental setup itself assumed random scenarios which lead to substantial underper-
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formance of the compromises. The goal of the study was to establish a lower bound on
performance, however the expected success rate under real life conditions are much higher,
since the attacker will not choose general and random setups but ones that are optimal.
This underscores the importance of future work on further experimental setups for the cho-
sen compromises, along with other compromises targeted at other algorithms. The need for
future work on detection techniques is essential to counter the threat demonstrated in this
proof of concept.
While the main focus of this research was to present the Unsupervised Learning Trojan
security aspect, its scope goes beyond security. Other possible implications reside in the
potential to further machine learning research on problems where memorization of sequences
for execution are desired, alongside the generalization properties of the algorithm. Future
research may provide further insight on this and other properties of this field of study.
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Appendices
A. Result Tables for K-means Experiments
Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 14.23 12.80
2 1 567 27.12 43.53
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -15.44 -26.12
2 4.950 -3.86
3 69.44 -33.59
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 3199 0.24 0.0045 5.90*e-5 0.0011 11
2 0 4863 0.32 0.0046 7.89*e-5 0.0014 13
3 0 1441 0.13 0.0049 3.24*e-5 0.0017 12
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.00 12.69
2 1 606 26.73 43.91
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.32 0.0013 2.26*e-5 0.0014
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (124*2)+4863 (124*2)+4863
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 10: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using Polymorphic
ShellCode - setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 107 14.19 12.69
2 1 567 27.30 44.87
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -5.27 -64.87
2 20.80 22.01
3 28.43 53.76
Sample Addl points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 40723 4427 0.08 0.0030 6.08*e-5 9.96*e-5 12
2 44286 24 0.99 0.0038 2.67*e-7 0.0003 11
3 34684 2654 0.94 0.0024 6.24*e-6 0.0003 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.02 12.72
2 1 606 26.69 43.57
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.002 1.45*e-5 0.0017
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (124*2)+2654 0 (124*2)+2654
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 11: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points using-
Polymorphic ShellCode - setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistcs
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 92 13.97 12.61
2 1 579 26.72 44.16
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 2.66 25.21
2 -26.52 13.85
3 54.45 5.56
Sample Addl points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 889 0.10 0.0027 0.0002 0.0001 14
2 0 3670 0.27 0.0023 3.16*e-05 0.0014 8
3 0 1500 0.14 0.0038 1.68*e-05 0.0017 14
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1(Randomly Selected)
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.07 12.75
2 1 606 26.83 43.75
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.10 0.0016 .077*e-6 0.0018
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (131*2)+889 (131*2)+889
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 12: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using OSX_Intel re-
verse_tcp shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 14.07 12.57
2 1 606 26.098 45.00
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 49.75 -1.67
2 -22.08 42.82
3 36.42 -17.65
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 47106 2460 0.96 0.0027 4.62*e-5 0.0001 10
2 28946 4003 0.10 0.0026 1.07*e-5 0.0010 8
3 31168 1966 0 0.0028 5.65*e-6 0.0009 18
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.04 12.75
2 1 579 26.76 43.54
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0018 1.23*e-5 0.0016
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (131*2)+31168 0 (131*2)+31168
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 13: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points using
OSX_Intel reverse_tcp shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 92 13.94 12.63
2 1 509 26.32 42.67
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 3.94 60.39
2 -13.83 33.83
3 12.14 16.20
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 1804 0 0.0033 0.0004 9.62*e-5 9
2 0 413 0 0.0034 7.32*e-6 0.0016 10.5
3 0 4343 0 0.0034 0.0008 8.03*e-5 10.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2(Randomly Chosen)
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.08 12.74
2 1 606 26.93 44.12
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0020 1.16*e-6 0.0015
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (428*2)+413 0 (428*2)+413
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 14: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP
PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 94 13.97 12.51
2 1 606 26.64 43.60
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -33.74 44.68
2 -41.71 6.42
3 -30.64 -60.05
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 27628 1466 0.95 0.0017 0.0007 0.9558 9.5
2 45021 305 0.01 0.0021 7.24*e-6 6.99*e-5 13
3 52233 3775 0.06 0.0017 4.29*e-6 0.0007 7.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 94 13.98 12.51
2 1 606 26.64 43.60
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.01 0.0034 3.20*e-5 0.0001
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (428*2)+305 (428*2)+305
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 15: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points using
Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 688 404.28 112.02
2 -1 60017 35847.80 9055.42
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -52.52 -171.88
2 -685.40 -17.81
3 -281.10 42.66
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 37 0.61 0.6100 1.78*e-5 2.50*e-5 8
2 0 4 0.54 0.6151 1.62*e-5 2.87*e-5 13
3 0 8 0 0.6143 1.64*e-5 2.83*e-5 15
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 401.75 130.64
2 -1 60081 35981.72 9470.95
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.24 0.6160 6.660*e-6 4.28*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (124*2)+8 (124*2)+8
Benign 0 422 422
Table 16: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set Baseline Using Linux_x86 Polymorphic
ShellCode - setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 743 403.17 104.64
2 -1 57629 35588.37 9261.62
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -168.07 -770.24
2 158.09 243.36
3 -106.44 -393.13
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 318 26 0.26 0.5541 5.45*e-6 3.85*e-5 9
2 478 41 0.26 0.5814 6.08*e-6 4.02*e-5 12
3 372 44 0.26 0.5751 5.91*e-6 4.01*e-5 9
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 743 403.17 104.64
2 -1 57629 35588.37 9261.62
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.6151 8.11*e-6 4.04*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (124*2)+41 0 (124*2)+41
Benign 0 422 422
Table 17: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set with Additional Points using Linux_x86
Polymorphic ShellCode - setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size of 105 Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 815 391.28 124.68
2 -1 54578 37118.45 7616.57
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -638.04 297.62
2 93.84 269.38
3 843.95 -393.48
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 23 0 0.6814 2.08*e-5 2.28*e-5 11
2 0 26 0 0.6819 2.09*e-5 2.27*e-5 12
3 0 27 0 0.6880 2.10*e-5 2.21*e-5 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 404.98 127.61
2 -1 60081 35665.56 9759.65
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.60 0.6169 1.68*e-5 2.47*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (131*2)+27 (131*2)+27
Benign 0 422 422
Table 18: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set Baseline Using OSX_Intel reverse_tcp shell
x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size of 105 Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 419.81 135.35
2 -1 52258 36235.11 9316.50
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -18.83 -67.37
2 415.64 -249.75
3 133.95 313.97
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 396 38 0.24 0.5796 5.49*e-6 4.10*e-5 9
2 391 11 0.22 0.5934 5.11*e-6 4.05*e-5 12
3 268 29 0.30 0.5533 6.38*e-6 3.69*e-5 9
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 887 397.88 124.65
2 -1 60081 35885.35 9406.63
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.57 0.5879 1.31*e-5 2.20*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (131*2)+11 (131*2)+11
Benign 0 422 422
Table 19: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set with Additional Points using OSX_Intel
reverse_tcp shell x86_64
127
Training Results Baseline Size of 105 Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 815 386.96 115.871
2 -12 57606 37891.71 8073.71
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -65.73 345.85
2 264.89 464.50
3 231.59 206.75
206.753716698854
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 21 0 0.6574 2.972*e-5 5.48*e-6 11
2 0 16 0 0.6554 2.973*e-5 5.51*e-6 14
3 0 5 0 0.6597 2.969*e-5 5.55*e-6 11
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 406.06 129.53
2 -1 60081 35473.16 9629.18
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.6023 2.028*e-5 1.54*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (428*2)+16 0 (428*2)+16
Benign 0 422 422
Table 20: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full
ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size of 105 Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 887 404.21 143.54
2 -1 57629 36631.10 9117.38
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 144.49 -135.54
2 734.99 207.75
3 702.94 48.13
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 245 4 0 0.6527 0.00043 1.16*e-5 15
2 420 32 0 0.6179 3.349*e-5 8.99*e-6 10
3 243 11 0 0.5463 3.78e-5 5.65*e-6 11
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 401.77 122.73
2 -1 60081 35786 9448.83
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.6156 3.73*e-5 8.96*e-6
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (428*2)+4 0 (428*2)+4
Benign 0 422 422
Table 21: Results of Water Treatment Plant Data Set with Additional Points using Windows XP
PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 71 113 85.32 8.74
2 -46 336 34.39 21.80
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 83.01 3.87
2 20.67 154.31
3 76.59 105.77
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 1392 0 0.0222 0.0012 0.0002 12
2 0 228 0 0.0244 5.23*e-5 0.0004 13
3 0 836 0 0.0200 0.0001 0.0003 11
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.88
2 -46 310 34.61 21.52
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.11 0.0016 7.11*e-06 3.31*e-05
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 0 (124*2)+228 (124*2)+228
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 22: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set baseline using Linux_x86 Polymorphic ShellCode-
setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 72 113 85.39 9.08
2 -46 72 34.22 21.43
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -57.46 -21.50
2 24.16 201.21
3 -21.09 9.19
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 12015 1010 0.07 0.0249 9.26*e-5 7.86*e-5 9
2 11768 434 0.04 0.0252 3.52*e-5 8.25*e-5 11
3 12090 13 0.01 0.0246 1.12*e-5 8.39*e-5 10
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.889
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0044 5.99*e-6 5.53*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (124*2)+434 0 (124*2)+434
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 23: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points using Linux_x86 Polymorphic
ShellCode- setuid(0)+setgid(0)+add user ’iph’ without password to _etc_passwd
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 71 113 85.51 8.89
2 -100 72 34.74 21.23
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 32.76 -68.78
2 -15.98 17.86
3 -74.95 7.58
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 532 0 0.0905 0.0001 0.0013 11
2 0 1132 0 0.0935 0.0019 0.0004 12
3 0 796 0 0.1228 0.0015 0.0004 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0044 1.99*e-5 2.58*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (131*2)+1132 0 (131*2)+1132
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 24: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set baseline using OSX_Intel reverse_tcp shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 29 141 85.23 8.90
2 -188 72 34.19 21.79
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 116.50 13.32
2 -131.27 -38.37
3 -26.40 -42.30
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 8795 412 0.96 0.0309 3.54*e-5 6.96*e-5 10
2 11748 895 0.07 0.0303 4.60*e-5 6.80*e-5 11
3 8439 1373 0.12 0.0299 7.35*e-5 6.43*e-5 9
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 29 141 85.23 8.90
2 -188 72 34.19 21.79
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0073 1.68*e-5 2.76*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (131*2)+895 0 (131*2)+895
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 25: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points using OSX_Intel reverse_tcp
shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 71 113 85.39 8.92
2 -188 72 34.46 21.05
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 79.15 0.001
2 24.14 7.37
3 -38.96 162.69
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 611 0 0.0140 3.13*e-5 0.0002 11
2 0 370 0 0.0147 7.62*e-5 8.75*e-5 15
3 0 852 0.69 0.0129 3.64*e-5 0.0002 9
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.88
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.0042 1.42*e-5 2.91*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (428*2)+370 0 (428*2)+370
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 26: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set baseline using Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP
calc shellcode
134
Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 71 149 85.37 9.06
2 -160 336 33.93 22.99
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 -67.91 -96.25
2 -25.74 42.81
3 12.59 15.06
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 12065 2 0 0.0162 2.53*e-6 0.0002 12
2 10205 1028 0.90 0.0209 9.04*e-6 0.0002 13
3 11691 1173 0.91 0.0211 9.01*e-6 0.0002 11
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.88
2 -46 310 34.61 21.52
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.67 0.0037 1.25*e-5 4.29*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload (428*2)+1028 0 (428*2)+1028
Benign 14500 0 14500
Table 27: Results of Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points using Windows XP PRO
SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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B. Experimental Results Tables for Kohonen network Experiments
Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 65 13.48 12.21
2 1 218 23.38 34.22
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 28 209
2 27 58
3 23 26
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.531 0.077 0.0002 0.0247 12.75
2 0 0 1.559 0.671 0.0002 0.0236 13.75
3 0 0 1.766 0.624 0.0002 0.0311 11.75
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.96 11.87
2 1 539 25.95 25.97
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.796 0.551 0.0002 0.011
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 109 3 112
Benign 26 534 560
Table 28: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 67 13.17 11.52
2 1 144 20.66 27.82
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 46 143
2 25 48
3 16 2
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 505 1 0.44 0.70 0.0007 0.005 14.5
2 652 3 0.73 0.62 0.0004 0.007 13
3 654 4 1.35 0.57 0.0003 0.006 10.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.98 12.04
2 1 539 26.65 45.44
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.10 0.43 0.003 0.001
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 7 105 112
Benign 0 560 560
Table 29: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 71 14.27 12.23
2 1 270 26.09 39.95
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 28 89
2 27 66
3 22 31
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.60 0.68 0.0002 0.0298 12
2 0 0 1.30 0.66 0.0003 0.0235 11.5
3 0 0 1.57 0.64 0.0003 0.0354 14.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 84 13.20 11.88
2 1 314 24.08 37.18
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.06 0.62 0.0003 0.0226
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 113 0 113
Benign 47 513 560
Table 30: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/xp pro sp3
(EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 84 13.42 12.49
2 1 217 25.97 40.83
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 39 117
2 25 54
3 7 12
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 692 4 0.58 0.66 0.0004 0.0040 12.25
2 695 4 0.86 0.59 0.0003 0.0058 12.25
3 398 0 2.07 0.53 0.0002 0.0197 12.75
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 71 13.41 11.82
2 1 314 24.11 36.94
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.66 0.71 0.0005 0.0048
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 111 2 113
Benign 47 513 560
Table 31: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 1 27.80 11.65 4.69
2 231.85 247.26 238.90 4.13
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 24 243
2 16 243
3 11 233
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.12 0.65 0.0004 0.0468 16
2 0 0 1.38 0.66 0.0003 0.0411 15
3 0 0 2.03 0.64 0.0002 0.1591 7
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 33.2 11.34 4.93
2 230.98 249.37 239.31 4.44
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.58 0.68 0.0009 0.0197
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 104 8 112
Benign 11 549 560
Table 32: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set Baseline Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 1 25.40 9.39 5.04
2 231.88 246.70 240.21 3.38
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 14 244
2 14 244
3 2 237
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 602 4 0.55 0.05 0.0005 0.0057 14.5
2 383 2 0.95 0.53 0.0004 0.0060 15.75
3 412 2 2.58 0.66 0.0002 0.9413 7.75
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 30 9.62 5.02
2 231.61 247.08 240.21 3.18
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.00 0.69 0.0004 0.0850
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 112 0 112
Benign 42 518 560
Table 33: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set with Additional
Points Using win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 20 7.97 6.27
2 229.85 248.48 240.28 5.08
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 18 245
2 14 245
3 4 234
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.17 0.67 0.0003 0.0620 16
2 0 0 1.80 0.69 0.0002 0.130 14.5
3 0 0 2.18 0.66 0.0002 0.121 7.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 26 7.45 6.18
2 229.57 248.33 240.66 5.26
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.75 0.67 0.0005 0.0576
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 101 12 113
Benign 7 553 560
Table 34: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set Baseline Using
win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 20.6 6.74 3.74
2 235.32 247.43 241.40 3.01
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 15 246
2 10 244
3 4 243
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 448 3 0.75 0.56 0.0005 0.0044 11.5
2 576 2 0.87 0.54 0.0004 0.0058 13
3 476 1 2.26 0.49 0.0002 0.0223 13.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 21.8 6.24 3.48
2 234.19 248.32 241.63 2.978
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
2.41 0.65 0.0002 1.0457
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 111 2 113
Benign 52 508 560
Table 35: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set with Additional
Points Using win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 81 941 394.58 128.37
2 -1 55930 36041.76 9361.62
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 893 45967
2 523 45404
3 198 26990
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 0.85 0.46 2.14*e-6 2.58*e-5 12
2 0 0 1.25 0.39 2.04*e-6 3.28*e-5 11
3 0 0 1.23 0.47 1.83*e-6 3.23*e-5 15
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 887 404.16 126.78
2 -1 60081 35933.46 9396.65
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.57 0.44 3.21*e-6 2.09*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 85 27 112
Benign 0 422 422
Table 36: Results of Water Treatment Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add
Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 841 414.17 125.12
2 -1 50942 35631.84 6216.95
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 630 42549
2 539 41848
3 482 14109
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 295 2 0.58 0.477 5.93*e-6 2.49*e-5 13.75
2 287 2 0.71 0.24 5.07*e-6 2.50*e-5 14.75
3 390 8 0.86 0.59 3.89*e-6 2.57*e-5 9.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 399.29 127.48
2 -1 60081 36035.45 10022.79
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.06 0.61 2.40*e-6 2.71*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 112 0 112
Benign 31 391 422
Table 37: Results of Water Treatment Data Set with Additional Points Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 81 941 408.27 124.48
2 -1 60017 36344.12 10152.93
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 621 55131
2 533 46497
3 509 46413
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.03 0.84 0.0004 2.6*e-5 12
2 0 0 1.23 0.80 2.0*e-6 3.0*e-5 12
3 0 0 1.13 0.45 2.2*e-6 2.8*e-5 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 887 400.758 127.76
2 -1 60081 35858 9197.50
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.54 0.121 4.17*e-6 2.06*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 105 8 113
Benign 6 418 422
Table 38: Results of Water Treatment Data Set Baseline Using win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add
new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 815 389.15 133.423
2 -1 57606 35561.43 3.025
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 737 50511
2 523 35564
3 287 21582
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 330 3 0.66 0.48 5.19*e-6 2.2*10-5 12.25
2 441 3 0.84 0.27 2.36*e-6 2.23*e-5 14.25
3 511 2 1.36 0.48 1.71*e-6 2.94*e-5 11.50
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 405.51 125.33
2 -1 60081 36052.97 9036.87
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.95 0.27 2.8*e-6 2.5*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 113 0 113
Benign 45 377 422
Table 39: Results of Water Treatment Data Set with Additional Points Using win32/xp pro sp3
(EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 67 13.97 11.18
2 1 217 24.50 33.08
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 18 200
2 22 209
3 17 217
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 4 0.04 2.06 0.0062 0.0016 16.5
2 0 5 0.04 2.05 0.0053 0.0015 11.5
3 0 7 0.05 2.04 0.0047 0.0016 10.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.77 12.13
2 1 539 25.69 44.62
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.0400 1.48 0.0053 0.0006
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 5 107 112
Benign 0 560 560
Table 40: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode for additional data to carry out Friedman test
148
Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 67 14.03 13.02
2 1 539 28.12 56.00
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 22 100
2 37 70
3 31 110
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 309 8 0.03 2.25 0.0079 0.0018 14.5
2 312 15 0.04 2.29 0.0080 0.0018 16.5
3 403 18 0.04 2.26 0.0077 0.0017 9
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.76 11.66
2 1 499 24.79 38.46
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.055 2.72 0.0062 0.0030
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 4 108 112
Benign 0 560 560
Table 41: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode for additional data to carry out Friedman test
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C. Experimental Results Tables for Kohonen network Experiments U-Matrix Encoding
Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 57 13.11 10.69
2 1 145 21.86 28.43
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 49 56
2 23 50
3 15 49
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.58 0.07 1.29*e-11 9.46*e-05 12
2 0 0 1.85 0.04 1.21*e-11 0.0008 12
3 0 0 2.13 0.11 1.01*e-11 0.0194 14
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.99 12.23
2 1 539 26.35 45.38
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.66 0.089 1.36*e-11 1.82*e-7
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 105 455 560
Table 42: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 65 15.83 13.03
2 1 218 28.14 37.78
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 57 205
2 29 66
3 10 38
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 546 5 1.30 0.12 4.28*e-11 2.56*e-8 7.5
2 463 3 0.97 0.13 7.24*e-11 0.0005 15
3 613 2 2.17 0.20 3.57*e-11 0.0201 15.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.31 11.60
2 1 539 24.78 43.66
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
2.15 0.15 3.21*e-11 0.0910
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 95 465 560
Table 43: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 84 13.48 12.33
2 1 190 24.50 34.35
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 40 174
2 26 59
3 6 14
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 2.28 0.07 2.88*e-11 0.0049 9
2 0 0 1.88 0.08 3.01*e-11 0.0002 15.5
3 0 0 2.56 0.08 2.31*e-11 1.11 13.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 71 13.39 11.85
2 1 314 24.48 38.57
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.09 0.05 5.88*e-11 0.0054
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 130 2 132
Benign 67 493 560
Table 44: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/xp pro sp3
(EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
152
Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 71 15.01 13.61
2 1 314 31.8 51.21
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 48 86
2 29 83
3 8 58
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 357 0 0.65 0.70 8.61*e-11 5.82*e-6 13
2 384 0 1 0.08 4.33*e-11 1.07*e-6 13
3 635 6 2.10 0.07 3.15*e-11 0.0006 10.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1(Chosen Randomly)
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 84 13.01 11.47
2 1 241 22.66 33.32
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.9 0.14 5.02*e-11 1.01*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 115 445 560
Table 45: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 33.2 10.98 4.72
2 230.98 249.37 239.37 4.37
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 30 245
2 16 244
3 5 237
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.66 0.08 1.25*e-11 7.03*e-5 11
2 0 0 1.89 0.66 1.17*e-11 0.0091 14
3 0 0 2.57 0.11 9.51*e-12 0.2506 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 30.6 11.50 4.922
2 231.57 248.94 239.19 4.38
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.03 0.04 2.07*e-11 8.52*e-6
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 130 2 132
Benign 92 468 560
Table 46: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set Baseline Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 1 24.6 9.87 4.33
2 231.99 246.58 240.11 3.26
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 21 245
2 14 243
3 11 232
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 486 2 1.28 0.11 1.68*e-11 0.0002 12.5
2 421 2 1.33 0.23 1.54*e-11 0.0003 16.75
3 510 4 1.86 0.19 1.18*e-11 8.86*e-6 8.75
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 30 9.50 5.18
2 231.61 247.08 240.23 3.21
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.05 0.20 2.08*e-11 0.006
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 35 525 560
Table 47: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set with Additional
Points Using win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 21.2 6.38 6.21
2 229.57 248.31 241.18 5.30
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 18 246
2 13 246
3 10 242
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.56 0.14 3.29*e-11 0.0004 15
2 0 0 1.96 0.11 2.94*e-11 4.09*e-6 11
3 0 0 2.01 0.01 3.08*e-11 0.0006 13
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 26.6 7.73 6.18
2 230.35 248.48 240.44 5.19
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.68 0.17 6.90*e-11 3.57*e-7
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 128 4 132
Benign 37 523 560
Table 48: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set Baseline Using
win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 16.4 6.86 3.68
2 234.53 248.32 241.58 3.05
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 13 246
2 11 245
3 7 240
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 456 2 1.33 0.21 3.80*e-11 0.0006 9.5
2 482 1 1.09 0.14 4.56*e-11 0.0013 15.75
3 683 1 1.69 0.10 2.59*e-11 0.0002 12.75
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 0.8 21.8 6.19 3.49
2 234.19 247.67 241.58 2.97
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.18 0.19 3.70*e-11 0.0067
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 70 490 560
Table 49: Results of Individual Household Electric Power Consumption Data Set with Additional
Points Using win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 81 841 410.35 127.58
2 -1 60017 37422.16 8541.91
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 766 54323
2 538 45964
3 171 10514
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0 1.62 0.93 1.07*e-12 9.86*e-8 13
2 0 0 1.82 0.52 1.13*e-12 9.47*e-8 14
3 0 0 1.54 0.05 4.45*e-12 1.60*e-6 11
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 400.24 126.96
2 -1 60081 35590.00 9544.17
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.83 0.09 2.32*e-12 3.92*e-8
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 120 12 132
Benign 61 361 422
Table 50: Results of Water Treatment Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add
Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 841 397.89 122.15
2 -1 60081 35285.49 9820.49
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 573 56447
2 520 45106
3 217 40999
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 446 5 0.87 0.62 1.80*e-12 6.51*e-8 8
2 339 3 0.91 0.04 2.12*e-12 1.84*10-5 15.5
3 451 11 0.70 0.43 2.94*e-12 2.18*e-11 14.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 403.34 128.34
2 -1 60017 3621.63 9272.00
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.99 0.12 1.97*e-12 2.83*e-7
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 83 339 422
Table 51: Results of Water Treatment Data Set with Additional Points Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 105 713 413.69 106.09
2 -1 49493 34395.04 10126.10
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 705 48913
2 339 44521
3 314 30144
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 2 1.33 0.12 1.49*e-12 1.87*e-5 11.75
2 0 0 2.01 0.10 1.11*e-12 8.77*e-8 10.75
3 0 0 1.94 0.19 1.67*e-12 3.91*e-5 15.50
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 399.41 131.72
2 -1 60081 36343.19 9156.22
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
1.522 0.60 2.10*e-12 2.13*e-8
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 124 8 132
Benign 55 367 422
Table 52: Results of Water Treatment Data Set Baseline Using win32/xp pro sp3 (EN) 32-bit - add
new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 105 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 713 413.63 115.12
2 -1 5528 36454.51 7835.27
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 671 6957
2 529 44290
3 310 22613
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 412 7 0.62 0.04 1.69*e-11 1.06*e-8 8.25
2 340 2 1.076 0.62 1.99*e-11 3.28*e-6 16.5
3 179 7 1.85 0.07 2.33*e-12 8.85*e-7 13.25
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 2
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 -1 941 399.42 129.82
2 -1 60081 35830.76 9734.11
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.82 0.03 2.52*e-12 4.33*e-9
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 132 0 132
Benign 61 361 422
Table 53: Results of Water Treatment Data Set with Additional Points Using win32/xp pro sp3
(EN) 32-bit - add new local administrator with U-Matrix Encoding
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 65 11.43 12.39
2 1 218 28.86 37.88
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 16 63
2 31 71
3 22 39
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 2 0.33 0.15 1.41*e-10 0.0322 8.5
2 0 0 0.26 0.17 2.30*e-10 0.0003 15
3 0 1 0.31 0.17 1.75*e-10 0.0021 15.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 3
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.49 11.81
2 1 539 24.60 43.62
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.2655 0.16 1.98*e-10 0.0156
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 68 64 132
Benign 0 560 560
Table 54: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using win32/PerfectXp-
pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding for additional data to carry out Fried-
man test
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Training Results Baseline Size 200 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 65 14.45 12.49
2 1 147 26.45 32.83
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 71 190
2 21 134
3 36 46
Sample Addl Points Addl Payload DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 546 9 0.33 0.16 1.44*e-10 0.0170 17
2 463 11 0.34 0.15 1.33*e-10 8.22*e-5 12.5
3 613 13 0.34 0.16 1.37*e-10 0.0185 9.5
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Sample 1
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 74 13.66 11.80
2 1 539 25.20 44.67
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.3379 0.17 1.62*e-10 0.0027
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 102 30 132
Benign 0 560 560
Table 55: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
win32/PerfectXp-pc1/sp3 (Tr) Add Admin Shellcode with U-Matrix Encoding for additional data
to carry out Friedman test
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D. Experimental Results Tables for Adaptive Resonance Algorithm Experiments
Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 13.98 12.88
2 1 509 26.40 42.15
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 117 517
2 130 650
3 200 1700
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_ben_av Score
1 0 0.065 0 1.34 0.0038 0.0019 1
2 0 0.100 0 1.63 0.0038 0.0019 2
3 0 0.200 0 1.84 0.0038 0.0019 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.16
Offset 117 for Order Column and 517 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 1 116 14.65 12.66
2 1 606 43.67 43.67
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.67 1.64 0.0012 0.00162
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 18 37 51
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 56: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using OSX/Intel - setuid
shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 13.89 11.58
2 1 539 25.37 44.13
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 300 5000
2 275 3000
3 275 2500
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 60 0.04 0 2.17 0.0038 0.0019 2
2 100 0.100 0 2.12 0.0038 0.0019 3
3 78 0.11 0 2.29 0.0038 0.0019 1
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.19
Offset 275 for Order Column and 2500 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.01 12.65
2 1 606 26.72 43.68
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.32 1.87 0.0026 0.0016
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 37 14 51
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 57: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
OSX/Intel - setuid shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.14 12.78
2 1 567 27.23 44.36
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 175 800
2 300 1200
3 300 1200
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 .044 0 2.37 0.0020 0.0017 1
2 0 .10 0 2.09 0.0020 0.0017 2
3 0 .16 0 2.41 0.0020 0.0017 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.022
Offset 175 for Order Column and 800 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 107 14.03 12.70
2 1 606 26.71 43.70
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 1.44 0.0020 0.0017
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 428 0 428
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 58: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP
PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 14.07 12.81
2 1 539 26.85 43.53
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 475 3000
2 375 2400
3 550 3600
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 44 0.17 0 2.64 0.002 0.0018 2
2 11 0.10 0 2.59 0.002 0.0018 1
3 147 0.18 0 1.9 0.002 0.0018 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.14
Offset 375 or Order Column and 2400 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.05 12.69
2 1 606 26.80 43.91
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 2.26 0.0020 0.0016
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 428 0 428
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 59: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 13.97 12.69
2 1 539 26.68 43.28
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 190 1300
2 257 2250
3 257 2250
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0.042 0 1.26 0.0040 0.0018 1
2 0 0.10 0 1.62 0.0040 0.0018 2
3 0 0.088 0 1.62 0.0040 0.0018 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.045
Offset 190 or Order Column and 1300 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.07 43.97
2 1 606 26.84 43.97
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 1.26 0.0040 0.0016
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 87 0 87
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 60: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP SP3
English MessageBoxA Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 10683 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 116 14.23 12.71
2 1 579 27.13 43.94
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 257 2250
2 257 2250
3 210 2050
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 186 0.14 0 2.08 0.0037 0.0017
2 64 0.10 0 1.61 0.0037 0.0017
3 156 0.05 0 2.25 0.0037 0.0017
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.04
Offset 210 or Order Column and 2050 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 2 111 14.07 12.71
2 1 606 26.72 43.80
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 1.30 0.0037 0.0016
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 87 0 87
Benign 0 42730 42730
Table 61: Results of KEGG Metabolic Relation Network Data Set with Additional Points Using
Windows XP SP3 English MessageBoxA Shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 21 113 85.32 8.99
2 -46 336 34.29 22.71
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 140 550
2 140 550
3 140 550
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 .12 0 0.18 0.0039 0.0002 2
2 0 .10 0 0.18 0.0039 0.0002 1
3 0 .13 0 0.18 0.0039 0.0002 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.05
Offset 140 or Order Column and 550 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.03 0.0039 2.38*e-05
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 51 0 51
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 62: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set Baseline Using OSX/Intel - setuid shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 64 113 85.14 8.81
2 -188 336 34.29 22.47
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 313 1101
2 210 750
3 597 1763
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 194 .046 0 0.27 0.0038 9.33*e-5 1
2 83 0.10 0 0.16 0.0038 9.33*e-5 2
3 196 0.19 0 0.28 0.0038 9.33*e-5 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.19
Offset 313 or Order Column and 1101 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.33 0.057 0.0025 2.38*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 34 17 51
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 63: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points Using OSX/Intel - setuid shell x86_64
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 72 113 85.40 8.82
2 -100 72 34.64 20.73
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 140 550
2 120 450
3 120 245
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0.15 0 0.18 0.0039 0.0002 3
2 0 0.10 0 0.21 0.0039 0.0002 2
3 0 0.03 0 0.07 0.0039 0.0002 1
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.16
Offset 120 or Order Column and 245 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0.78 0.015 0.0009 2.37*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 11 40 428
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 64: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 71 113 85.33 9.00
2 -188 436 34.49 23.19
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 170 2700
2 170 7100
3 170 3100
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 9 0.18 0 0.31 0.0039 6.82*e-5 3
2 73 0.10 0 0.96 0.0039 6.82*e-5 1
3 47 0.13 0 0.41 0.0039 6.82*e-5 2
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.09
Offset 170 or Order Column and 7100 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.33 0.0039 2.38*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 428 0 428
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 65: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points Using Windows XP PRO SP3 - Full
ROP calc shellcode
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 21 113 85.22 8.62
2 -46 436 33.95 23.24
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 120 630
2 120 760
3 120 840
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 0 0.07 0 0.14 0.0041 0.0001 1
2 0 0.10 0 0.17 0.0041 0.0001 2
3 0 0.17 0 0.26 0.0041 0.0001 3
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.12
Offset 120 or Order Column and 630 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.03 0.0041 2.38*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 87 0 87
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 66: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set Baseline Using Windows XP SP3 English MessageBoxA Shell-
code
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Training Results Baseline Size 2900 of Intercepted Samples
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 64 141 85.55 9.02
2 -46 72 35.38 20.47
Sample Offset for Order Column Offset for Payload Column
1 140 520
2 140 520
3 140 12009
Sample Addl Points Vigilance DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben Score
1 28 0.12 0 0.10 0.0041 8.45*e-5 3
2 34 0.10 0 0.10 0.0041 8.45*e-5 2
3 37 0.04 0 1.41 0.0041 8.45*e-5 1
Test Results for Selected Attack Using Vigilance of 0.11
Offset 140 or Order Column and 12009 for Payload Column
Sample Statistics
Column Min Max Mean STD_dev
1 40 118 85.37 8.89
2 -46 310 34.61 21.53
DS DCD dy_Trojan dy_Ben
0 0.48 0.0041 2.38*e-5
Confusion Matrix
Payload Benign Total
Payload 87 0 87
Benign 0 14500 14500
Table 67: Statlog (Shuttle) Data Set with Additional Points Using Windows XP SP3 English Mes-
sageBoxA Shellcode
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